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Summary
This thesis deals with the problem of aging hydropower infrastructure systems and system
components, a problem that is very common across Canada. Flaws of common risk analysis
methods are noted, and the need for new risk analysis approaches is identified. System dynamics
simulation method is introduced as an implementation mechanism for the System Theoretic
Process Analysis (STPA). STPA and its adaptation to complex hydropower systems are explained
thoroughly. Fuzzy logic is used to model operator’s decision making. The main objectives of the
research include the development of an automated generic approach that implements STPA and
fuzzy logic for the investigation and identification of potentially hazardous actions and hazardous
system states. The developed methodology is illustrated using a case study based on the BC
Hydro’s Cheakamus Dam, British Columbia, Canada.
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Introduction
1.1. Risk of dam systems
Aging hydropower systems across Canada pose a serious threat to the Canadian economy. Many
components of these systems are near the end of serviceable life and will require significant
investments in order to be replaced or upgraded (if possible). Many components are old or have
been poorly maintained, and require remedial attention. Technological advances over the past few
decades have resulted in increasing complexity of integrated civil infrastructure systems, making
management and operations of these systems more of a challenge (Leveson 2011). Constant
upgrades and replacement of the components also add to the complexity of the infrastructure.
Interdependencies of the system components are poorly understood in spite of the fact that system
performance and reliability are the result of interactions between engineered, natural and human
system components (Regan 2010; Leveson 2011; Thomas 2012; Baecher et al. 2013).
Risk is the combination of the probability of an event and its negative consequences. Risk
assessment includes a review of the technical characteristics of hazards such as their location,
intensity, frequency, and probability; the analysis of exposure and vulnerability including the
physical social, health, economic and environmental dimensions; and the evaluation of the
effectiveness of prevailing and alternative coping capacities in respect to likely risk scenarios. This
series of activities is sometimes known as a risk analysis process. (UNISDR, 2009).
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1.2. Traditional dam systems risk analysis
Traditional methods of dam systems risk analysis include Fault Tree Analysis, Event Tree
Analysis, Dynamic Event Tree Analysis, Failure Modes and Effects Analysis, and Failure Modes
Effects and Criticality Analysis. These methods have their disadvantages. Traditional methods of
engineering analysis tend to decompose the system into smaller, more manageable components,
which essentially ignore the interactions between them (Regan 2010; Leveson 2011; Thomas
2012). Limited emphasis is placed on events that could occur within the design envelope (Regan
2010). The dominant risks to be managed derive not from extreme events but adverse combinations
of less severe events and/or unusual combinations of usual events (Baecher et al. 2012 It is
established in the literature that traditional risk analysis methods cannot identify the hazards and
initiating events. Even when these are considered, they focus on major hazards and do not provide
a way to include all instigating events. Resulting scenarios that are analyzed do not cover unsafe
situations when there were no component failures but the lack of safety results from control
actions. Similarly, the failure of components or unsafe control actions might not result in a hazard.
Traditional methods assume linear progression of events, though component interactions can lead
to nonlinear behaviour of a system (Leveson 2011; Regan 2010; Thomas 2012). Traditional
analysis methods overlook or oversimplify the role of humans. Quantitative predictions of human
behaviour in complex systems are hard to generate. Human behaviour is unpredictable and
depends on the context in which the action is taken. In addition, the new technology is changing
the role of humans in systems from followers of procedures to supervisors of automation and high
– level decision makers (Thomas 2012).
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1.3. Systems approach to dam systems risk analysis
A system is defined as “a collection of various structural and nonstructural elements that are
connected and organized in such a way as to achieve some specific objective through the control
and distribution of material resources, energy, and information” (Simonovic 2009). Simulation is
one of the techniques used in systems analysis. Simulation inputs may be varied to determine
system behaviour under various conditions (Simonovic, 2009) and link system structure to its
behaviour.
Many researchers advocate the application of systems analysis to risk analysis. Regan (2010),
Baecher (2013) and Komey et al., (2015) advocate for the consideration of water flow – control
dams as systems and using systems approach for risk analysis of dam systems. To deal with the
aspect of control flaws in risk analysis, Regan (2010) and Baecher et al. (2013) point to control
systems theory. Control systems theory is an interdisciplinary approach that involves the use of
feedback to determine how systems behave in response to inputs and as a result of system structure
(Leveson 2011). The primary differences between traditional techniques and a systems approach
are: (1) the traditional approach relies on top-down systems thinking rather than bottom-up; (2)
the traditional view has a reliability engineering focus (Dulac, 2007).
In order to deal with the disadvantages of traditional methods, systems approach was taken through
the use of system dynamics simulation. In system dynamics, the behaviour of the system is linked
to its underlying structure (the relationships between system components) and the dynamics of
how the system changes over time can be investigated by changing either the inputs or the structure
(Simonovic, 2009).
3

System Theoretic Process Analysis (STPA), a hazard analysis method based on System-Theoretic
Accident Model and Processes (STAMP) is used to investigate the impacts of control actions in
the system. The term hazard can be defined as a dangerous phenomenon, substance, human activity
or condition that may cause loss of life, injury or other health impacts, property damage, loss of
livelihoods and services, social and economic disruption, or environmental damage (UNISDR,
2009). Hazard analysis is the first step in the risk analysis process. STAMP treats safety as a
control problem, rather than as component failure problem. STPA can be used to derive causal
factors related to human controllers within the context of the system and its design.
1.4. Research objective
This research focuses exclusively on risk analysis of dam systems. There are many different dam
types, and each type has different risks to consider. Concrete dams (gravity and arch dams) have
risks related to overtopping, sliding, overturning and foundation erosion. Embankment dams have
risks related to slope instability and internal erosion in addition to those of concrete dams. Most of
these risks can be attributed to poor design or other factors. This research focuses on the risk of
dam overtopping due to both control flaws and component failures under a range of conditions and
external disturbances. The focus is not on the extreme conditions and events as in the traditional
dam risk analysis methods.
The main objective of this research is to develop a tool that will investigate all of the possible
scenarios in which the system may encounter a hazardous state. A system is said to be in a
“hazardous state” when a threat exists that a hazard may occur now or in the near future. Many
factors can lead to hazardous system states such as component failure, software errors, or control
4

actions. It is possible that component failure or unsafe control actions might not result in a hazard.
Therefore, there is a need for a tool that will continuously investigate the system states. This
procedure is a part of the risk analysis project “Systems Engineering Approach to the Reliability
of Complex Civil Infrastructure” supported by BC Hydro and Natural Sciences and Engineering
Council of Canada and lead by Dr. Simonovic. The main project tasks involve: creation of
hydropower dam hazardous states (research presented in this thesis), hydropower dam system
safety simulation and system resilience assessment. Hazardous system states are recorded and may
be used as input for system safety simulation that will provide system operating conditions and
assess them using resilience metric. Resilience is a dynamic quantitative measure of system
performance that covers the time from the beginning of an undesirable event to full system
recovery from it (Simonović and Peck, 2013).
A fuzzy logic controller is developed to model the dam operator’s decision – making and control
actions. The control strategies of the dam’s operator can be put together in terms of numerous
descriptive rules. When describing different decisions made at various stages of a process, human
beings have a preference to use qualitative expressions instead of quantitative ones. The dam
operator’s behavior and decision making are modelled using the approximate reasoning algorithm
developed in this thesis. It is well-known that operators of many systems have a fuzzy notion of
various quantities. Human operators use their subjective knowledge or linguistic information on a
daily basis when making decisions. Human beings are capable of processing such information and,
based on it, make subsequent decisions. The operation of reservoirs and dam spillway gates are
inherently nonlinear, and cannot be represented exactly by linear models used in conventional
system identification. As such, the fuzzy logic based approach is a powerful expert system
5

technique to effectively control real, complex and unpredictable processes with nonlinear and
time-varying properties (Ross, 2010). Fuzzy control can be considered one of the most suitable for
mathematical modelling of a process that is (a) deficient or complicated, (b) nonlinear or timedependent, or (c) difficult to control with the conventional methods. Fuzzy control grants effective
solutions for nonlinear and partially unknown processes, mainly because of its ability to combine
information from different sources, such as available mathematical models and experience of
operators (Bagis, 2004). The environment in which operators make decisions is most often
complex, making it difficult to formulate a suitable mathematical decision-making model. Thus,
the development of fuzzy logic systems seems justified in such situations.

1.5. Organization of the thesis
Traditional dam risk analysis methods and the dam accident reports are covered in Chapter 2,
literature review. Basics of STPA are covered in the systems approach part of the literature review,
Section 2.3. Basics of fuzzy logic and fuzzy inference are covered in Section 2.4.
STPA formulation, system dynamics simulation and automated generation and failure states are
covered in the methodology section of the thesis presented in Chapter 3. Data used and the results
are presented in the Cheakamus Dam case study section, Chapter 4. The document ends with
conclusions and future work in Chapter 5.

Literature Review
It is documented in the literature that there is a need for automated generation and investigation of
scenarios that will describe hazardous states of a system originating from the failure of
6

components, control actions and the combination of the two. Hydropower systems are complex
systems that are sensitive to component failures and unsafe control actions that can result in major
disasters. Component failures, component interactions, human behavior, and control actions
should be evenly investigated in the hazard analyses. This chapter will cover the basics and issues
of traditional dam systems risk analysis methods. Two historical dam accident reports that
highlight the need to examine dams as systems are presented.

2.1. Traditional dam safety risk analysis methods
Traditional dam safety risk analysis methods include Fault Tree Analysis, Event Tree Analysis,
Dynamic Event Tree Analysis, Failure Modes and Effects Analysis and Failure Modes Effects and
Criticality Analysis.
The Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) begins with an undesirable event but does not provide means to
identify undesirable events. Figure 1 shows an example fault tree of the Minuteman missile system
gas valve from the original Bell Laboratory Study (Ericson, 1999).

7

Figure 1. Fault tree example gas valve from the original Bell Laboratory study (after Thomas,
2012).
The undesirable event is shown in the top rectangle. The analysis proceeds in a top-down fashion
to identify the causes of the undesirable event, as in the case where a system component does not
operate in accordance with its specification. The analysis must also be based on an existing model
of the system. Logic gates (OR and AND) are used to connect the events. When the fault tree is
complete, it can be analyzed to determine combinations of component failures sufficient to cause
a top-level undesirable event.
The FTA does not include any standard system model. Expert judgement has been used as a way
to identify and quantify operator errors in a fault tree (Thomas, 2012) which is subjective. Event
trees also begin with an initiating event but do not provide a way to identify systematically the
initiating events or how to include all relevant events. Human behaviour is reduced to a binary
8

decision that is connected to a context in which it occurs. Due to the top-down nature of the
analysis fault trees can become quite large for complex systems and may be difficult to interpret.
There is no way to verify that all of the event causes have been identified. There is no stopping
rule when performing FTA. Failure and fault tree can usually be decomposed further.
The event tree analysis (ETA) graphically presents the propagation of events leading up to a failure
(Hartford and Baecher 2004). A simplified event tree for a nuclear reactor failure is shown in
Figure 2.

Figure 2. Simplified event tree for a nuclear reactor (after Thomas, 2012)
The first step is to identify an initiating event, shown in the first column in Figure 2. The event
tree introduces a set of barriers or protective functions intended to prevent an event leading to an
accident. Logical trees are created by tracking the initiating event forward in time and inserting
9

binary branches at each barrier to reflect the success or failure of that barrier (Thomas, 2012).
Barriers in the event tree are often assumed to operate independently, while in practice that is often
not the case, especially if human behaviour is involved. In the ETA, human behaviour is reduced
to a binary decision. This simplification removes the context that explains why the operator would
choose the given action. In the real world, human behaviour is associated with the context in which
it occurs. Event trees also disregard high-level systemic causes, such as organizational, managerial,
or political. ETA cannot analyze design errors and requirement flaws, which are critical factors.
In the nuclear reactor example, operators were not aware of the coolant loss because indicator
lamps suggested everything was in order. The instruments satisfied their requirements, but the
design was flawed.
The dynamic event tree analysis method was created with the intention to examine more
comprehensively the accident scenario space in traditional event tree analysis. The word
“dynamic” can be used to describe periodic updates on the probabilistic risk analysis (PRA) to
reflect any changes in the system configuration. Another use is when the PRA model is updated to
account for equipment deterioration. (Hakobyan et al., 2008). In dynamic PRA analysis, event
tree scenarios run simultaneously starting from a single initiating event. The branching occurs at
user – specified times and/or when an action is required by the system and/or the operator, thus
creating a sequence of events based on the time of their occurrence. For example, every time a
system parameter exceeds a given threshold, branching takes place based on the possible outcomes
of the system/component response. These outcomes then decide how the dynamic system variables
will evolve over time for each branch. Since two different outcomes at a branching may lead to
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completely different paths for system evolution, the next branching for these paths may occur not
only at different times but also based on different branching criteria. (Hakobyan et al., 2008).
Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Failure Modes Effects and Criticality Analysis
(FMECA) were developed to evaluate the effect of component failures on system performance
systematically. FMEA follows the bottom-up approach. Various components of the system are
identified and then failure modes - mechanisms by which a component may fail to achieve its
designed function, are investigated. FMECA follows the same process but assigns a criticality to
each failure mode based on severity and probability of each identified effect. Resulting scenarios
that are analyzed include both, hazardous and nonhazardous scenarios triggered by a failure.
Unfortunately, a set of scenarios triggered by failure does not necessarily include all unsafe
scenarios. FMECA does not capture nonlinear and feedback relationships and omits scenarios that
result from a combination of several failures. FMECA also assumes a linear progression of events
and does not capture nonlinear relationships. FMECA omits scenarios that result from a
combination of several failures.
The “Bow-tie” model is the composition of fault and event tree. The illustration of the “bow-tie”
model is shown in Figure 3.
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Figure 3. Illustration of the "Bow-tie" model (after Markowski et al., 2011)
The fault tree identifies causes of the top event, while the event tree presents consequences of the
event. It is intended to prevent, control and mitigate undesired events through the development of
a logical relationship between the causes and consequences of an undesired event (Dianous and
Fiévez, 2006). The “Bow-tie” model follows the same assumptions of event and fault trees. The
assumptions consider the crisp probabilities and independent relationships for the input events.
The probabilities are often hard to obtain or are missing, which introduces data uncertainty
(Ferdous et al., 2013). There have been some improvements to the “bow – tie” model recently with
the use of fuzzy logic to negate data uncertainty and overcome missing data (Ferdous, 2013).
Event based techniques are not suited to handle complex software – intensive systems, complex
human-machine interactions, and nested systems with distributed decision-making that cut across
both physical and organizational boundaries (Dulac, 2007). To summarize, major disadvantages
of the traditional methods are:
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Subjective judgement is required in selection of events and failure modes (Hartford and
Baecher, 2004)



Events are assumed to be independent



Emphasis placed on component failures rather than design or control flaws which could be
just as dangerous (Leveson, 2011)



Assumption of linear progression of events, though component interactions can lead to
nonlinear behaviour of the system (Leveson, 2011)



Systems are decomposed into more manageable sub-systems (Leveson 2011; Regan 2010;
Thomas 2012)



Oversimplified human behaviour and limited ability to deal with software flaws (Thomas,
2012)

2.2. Historical dam accidents
Examination of the Taum Sauk Dam failure in the central US and the Sayano – Shushenskaya
powerhouse incident in Siberia, Russia, highlights the need to examine dams as systems.

2.2.1. Taum Sauk Dam failure
The Taum Sauk pump storage plant is located in the St. Francois mountain region of the Missouri
Ozarks. The Taum Sauk plant is pump – back only operation. There is no natural primary flow
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available for power generation. Power is generated by water flowing from a reservoir on top of the
Proffit Mountain into a lower reservoir on the East Fork of the Black River. Water is pumped back
during the night when the electrical generation system is running at low – cost baseline capacity.
On December 14, 2005, the northwest side of the upper reservoir was overtopped. Overtopping
led to the failure of the reservoir wall and the release of 3.8 million cubic meters of water. A
combination of design and construction flaws, unsafe operation, and delayed maintenance caused
the upper reservoir to overtop. State of the reservoir after the breach is shown in Figure 4.

Figure 4. Taum Sauk Dam and upper reservoir after the wall breach, Lesterville, Missouri, US.
(https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/Category:Taum_Sauk_Reservoir_breach#/media/File:Tau
m_Sauk_upper_aerial-USGS-Picture037.jpg, last accessed on July 19, 2016)
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Several investigation reports focus on the technical reasons for the breach (Regan, 2010). These
reports present a clear picture of the mechanics of the failure of the Taum Sauk Dam. However,
the reports do not provide a complete picture of the interactions, control actions and decisions, and
design flaws that contributed to the failure.
Overtopping of the Taum Sauk occurred because of complex interactions of numerous decisions
made over a period of time from the planning stage of the project (e.g. no spillway on the dam)
and including actions during design, construction, operation and decisions made by the owner and
society at large (Regan, 2010). The dam was constructed with uncompact rockfill which led to an
excessive settlement. Operations staff lowered the allowable maximum water level because of the
excessive settlement. Later, the retirement of the operations staff resulted in losing that knowledge,
and the designers of the new water level monitoring system were unaware of the previous decision
to lower the allowable water surface level. The designers instead referred to the original drawings
to determine the normal maximum water level. This resulted in the normal maximum water level
being set a few inches below the low point of the parapet wall. Settlement caused cracking in the
impermeable water barrier for the dam. Cracking resulted in excessive leakage that was remediated
by the installation of the geomembrane across the upstream face of the dam. Penetration of the
geomembrane was not allowed in order to ensure its prevention of the excessive leaking. The
inability to penetrate geomembrane required the water level monitoring system to be modified.
The Modified system included PVC conduits for the sensors and the associated cables leading
back to the top of the dam. In order to minimize costs, inlet/outlet of the water conduit was placed
in the southern part of the dam, because it was the shortest path to the powerhouse. Also, the water
level sensors were placed in the southern part of the reservoir to minimize cable length from the
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instrument to the powerhouse. The design of the inlet/outlet resulted in swirling in the reservoir as
water flowed through. The swirl caused vibrations in the instrumentation cables, which then
loosened and ultimately broke apart the system that held PVC conduits. Swirling water deflected
the unsupported PVC conduits. That deflection caused the water level sensors to move upward
resulting in erroneous water level readings being sent to Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition
system (SCADA). The operators were aware of the movement and adjusted the SCADA system.
In addition, the high water level alarm and the “high – high” water level alarms, which should have
automatically turn off the pumps, were also set incorrectly. The alarms were programmed not to
alarm until the parapet wall was overtopping.
In December 2005, the Taum Sauk pumped storage hydropower system provided significant
financial benefits to its owner (Regan, 2010). Utility profits were driven by market conditions.
Planned maintenance and repair of the sensors system were delayed until a planned future outage.
This is a case where reliability, safety, and profits come into conflict.

2.2.2. Sayano – Shushenskaya powerhouse accident
Sayano – Shushenskaya Dam (Russian: Сая́но-Шу́шенская гидроэлектроста́нция, SayanoShushenskaya Gidroelektrostantsiya) is an arch – gravity dam located on the Yenisei River, near
Sayanogorsk in Khakassia, Russia. Hydropower system consists of the 242 metres high, 1,066
metres long crest. The plant operated ten 640 MW turbines with total installed capacity of 6,400
MW.
On August 17, 2009, hydropower plant suffered a catastrophic failure of a turbine unit resulting in
flooding of the powerhouse and loss of 75 lives. The main cause of the failure was the failure of
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the bolts holding the turbine head cover to the scroll case on unit #2 (Regan, 2010). Unit #2 and
state of the powerhouse after the accident are shown in Figure 5.

Figure 5. Sayano - Shushenskaya turbine unit #2 and the powerhouse after the 2009 accident
(after Regan, 2010)
After the bolts failed the turbine was ejected vertically through the generator. Water flowing
through the opening flooded the lower level of the powerhouse, trapping workers and causing
extensive damage to the power plant. Power output fell to zero, resulting in a local blackout. It
took over 3.5 hours to mobilize an auxiliary power source and close the penstock intake gates.
During that time turbines continued to spin without load.
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Tests of the Sayano – Shushenskaya turbine design at the time of manufacturing showed zones of
water head to power combinations that should be avoided during operation due to unacceptably
high vibrations (Regan, 2010). On the day of failure, the turbine was operated in a load – following
manner and turbine #2 transitioned through the “not recommended”, high vibration zone on at
least six occasions (Regan, 2010). Investigations after the failure showed that 49 out of the 80 bolts
holding the head cover showed signs of fatigue fracture. There is evidence that six bolts did not
even have nuts on them at the time of the failure (Regan, 2010).
Design decisions were made to not install turbine shut – off valves or back – up power for the
intake gates. This prevented shut – off of the unit #2 penstock after the head cover failed and led
to flooding of the powerhouse. The project Commissioning Report recommended design and
fabrication of new runners that would suffer less vibration but the privatization of the project led
to an increased financial performance and design of the new runners was postponed. Unit #2 had
been overhauled prior to the incident by a company closely allied with managers of the
powerhouse, raising the question if the maintenance was adequate. The maintenance report does
not mention inspection or replacement of any of the head cover bolts (ref.).
Before the failure, a fire occurred at another plant in the same electric system. A fire occurred at
Bratskaya Powerhouse. Bratskaya was being utilized to stabilize the power production in the
Unified Electric System of Siberia. The fire caused loss of communication between the control
center and the Bratskaya powerhouse. The control center transferred load control responsibilities
to Sayano – Shushenskaya. Operators at Sayano – Shushenskaya placed unit #2 in the load –
following mode. The unit control system did not account for the high vibration operation zone.
Unit #2 transitioned several times through this zone. Ultimately, enough clamping force was lost,
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either through continuing fatigue fracture or loosening of the nuts and head cover failed, ejecting
the turbine through the generator.
The accident analyses show that design flaws, software flaws (due to operator’s adjustments),
complex interactions, control actions, human behaviour and performance conditions interacted in
unforeseen ways that allowed the failures to progress (Regan, 2010). The failures of Taum Sauk
and Sayano – Shushenskaya were caused by a combination of mentioned factors and nonlinear
interactions among system components that were partly unrecognized prior to the failures.

2.3. Systems approach to dam safety risk analysis
Systems analysis is defined as “the use of rigorous methods to help determine preferred plans,
design and operations strategies for complex, often large-scale, systems” (Simonovic 2009).
Techniques that can be used in systems analysis include simulation and optimization (with single
and multiple objective functions). Simulation models describe how the system operates and are
used to assess what changes in system behaviour will result from a specific course of action.
Simulation models describe the state of the system in response to a change in system structure and
various inputs but give no direct measure of what decisions should be taken to improve the
performance of the system (Simonović 2009).
System-Theoretic Accident Model and Processes (STAMP) is an accident causation model
(Leveson 2011; Thomas 2012) that is based on systems theory. STAMP treats safety as a control
problem, rather than as a failure problem. Unsafe control includes inadequate handling of failures,
software design errors, and erroneous human decision making. Accidents are viewed as the result
of inadequate enforcement of constraints on system behaviour. The reason behind the inadequate
19

enforcement may involve classic component failures, but it can also result from unsafe interactions
among components operating as designed or from erroneous control actions by software or humans
(Thompson, 2012). STAMP is based on the observation that there are four types of hazardous
control actions that need to be eliminated or controlled to prevent accidents:


A control action required for safety is not provided or is not followed.



An unsafe control action is provided that leads to a hazard.



A potentially safe control action is provided too late, too early, or out of sequence.



A safe control action is stopped too soon or applied for too long.

The process model contains the controller’s understanding of (a) the current state of the controlled
process, (b) the desired state of the controlled process, and (c) the ways the process can change the
state. This model is used by the controller to determine what control actions are needed
(Thompson, 2012).
System Theoretic Process Analysis (STPA) is a hazard analysis technique built on STAMP. It can
be applied in order to derive causal factors related to human controllers within the context of the
system and its design. The objective of STPA is to identify scenarios of inadequate control that
could potentially lead to an accident.
STPA is performed using generic control system structure outlined by Leveson (2011). Schematic
presentation of a generic control system is shown in Figure 6.
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Figure 6. Schematic presentation of a generic control system (after Leveson 2011)
A stabilizing control loop includes a controller, actuators, a controlled process (the infrastructure),
and sensors which relay information back to the controller. According to Leveson (2011), this
high-level system structure represents a hierarchical system of systems, with each box representing
its own system.
A generic control system structure is implemented to capture the hydropower dam safety context.
The detailed control loop, as it relates to a hydropower dam safety is shown in Figure 7.
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Figure 7. Detailed control feedback loop for a hydropower dam system
The controlled process is the operation of the spillway gate. States of all inflows, disturbances, and
system components are automatically generated. Sensors relay system state information to the
controller, part (a) of the process model. A fuzzy inference system (FIS) introduced below, is used
to model the controller’s decision-making at a particular state of the system. The controller issues
instructions that are performed by actuators (if possible). System dynamics simulation is used to
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simulate water level change in the reservoir over time. Sensors monitor the water level and relay
information to the controller, closing the control feedback loop.

2.4. Fuzzy inference systems
To capture human component of the hydropower dam control feedback loop a fuzzy theoretic
approach is used. The decisions made by the human operators are described using fuzzy inference
system. Fuzzy inference is a part of the fuzzy logic controller. Mamdani inference system and
Sugeno inference system are the two most commonly used inference systems (Teodorovic, 2012).
This thesis will cover and use Mamdani inference in the fuzzy logic controller.
In certain cases, experienced operators achieve better results while operating complex systems
than automated control systems. Operator’s management strategies can be expressed as a set of
heuristic rules that are difficult to express using traditional algorithms. These difficulties are
caused by the fact that people mainly use qualitative expressions for a description of certain
situations. Theory of fuzzy sets and fuzzy logic offers an approach to computing based on "degrees
of truth" rather than the usual "true or false” (1 or 0) Boolean logic on which the modern computer
is based. Fuzzy logic systems were created from the desire to incorporate human experience,
intuition, and behaviour in the process of making decisions (Zimmermann, 1991). The idea of
developing a model of decision making based on imprecise, qualitative data and descriptive
linguistic rules that are combined using fuzzy logic comes from work of Lotfi Zadeh (1973).
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2.4.1. Basics of fuzzy set theory
In classical set theory, membership of objects is assessed in binary terms. An object either belongs
or does not belong to a set which is expressed with a 1 or a 0. Classical set membership function
𝜇𝐴̃ for an element x ∈ X can be expressed in mathematical form as:
1, 𝑖𝑓 𝑥 ∈ 𝐴
𝜇𝐴̃ (𝑥) = {
0, 𝑖𝑓 𝑥 ∉ 𝐴

(2.1)

where μÃ(x) is the function denoting the membership of x in set A.
Fuzzy set theory permits intermediate membership classes to sets. Characteristic function takes
values between 1 and 0, i.e. values in the real unit interval [0, 1]. If X is a universal set whose
elements are {x}, then a fuzzy set is defined by its membership function:
𝜇𝐴̃ : 𝑋 → [0, 1],

(2.2)

which assigns a degree in the interval [0, 1] of membership to every element x.
Fuzzy set can be represented by a set of ordered pairs of elements, which present the element
together with its membership value to the fuzzy set:
𝐴̃ = {(𝑥, 𝜇𝐴̃ (𝑥))|𝑥 ∈ X}

(2.3)

Membership functions can be generated using several methods: intuition, inference, rank ordering,
neural networks, genetic algorithms and inductive reasoning (Ross, 2010).
A fuzzy set is normal fuzzy set if at least one of its elements has a membership value of 1.
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2.4.2. Set-theoretic operations for fuzzy sets
Most common membership function shapes are presented in Figure 8.

Figure 8. (a) triangular, (b) trapezoid, (c) Gaussian and (d) sigmoid membership functions
The basic operations of fuzzy sets include intersection and union. Intersection of fuzzy set Ã with
B̃ , C̃ = Ã ∩ B̃ is defined by:
𝜇𝐂̃ (𝑥) = 𝑚𝑖𝑛{𝜇Ã (𝑥), 𝜇B̃ (𝑥)}, 𝑥 ∈ X
where:
μC̃ (x) is the membership of the fuzzy intersection of Ã and B̃ ;
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(2.4)

min ( ) is the ordinary minimum operator;
μÃ (x) is the membership of fuzzy set Ã; and
μB̃ (x) is the membership of fuzzy set B̃ .
Union of fuzzy set Ã with B̃ , C̃ = Ã ∪ B̃ is defined by:
𝜇𝐶̃ (𝑥) = 𝑚𝑎𝑥{𝜇Ã (𝑥), 𝜇𝐵̃ (𝑥)} , 𝑥 ∈ 𝑋
where:
μC̃ (x) = the membership of the fuzzy union of Ã and B̃ ;
max ( ) = the ordinary maximum operator;
μÃ (x) = the membership of fuzzy set Ã; and
μB̃ (x) = the membership of fuzzy set B̃ .
Graphical presentation of intersection and union are shown in Figure 9.
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(2.5)

Figure 9. Union (a) and intersection (b) of fuzzy sets Ã and B̃

A fuzzy number is a special case of fuzzy set that has the following properties:


it is defined in the set of real numbers;



it is a normal fuzzy set; and



it is convex.

Fuzzy number can be defined as follows:
𝑋̃ = {(𝑥, μ𝑥̃ (𝑥)): 𝑥 ∈ 𝑅; μ𝑥̃ (𝑥) ∈ [0,1]}
where
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(2.6)

X̃ is the fuzzy number;
μX̃ (x) is the membership value of element x to the fuzzy number; and
R is the set of real numbers.
A Fuzzy set is convex if and only if it satisfies the following property:
μÃ (𝜆𝑥1 + (1 − 𝜆)𝑥2 ) ≥ min(μÃ (𝑥1 ), μÃ (𝑥2 ))

(2.7)

where λ is the interval [0, 1] and x1<x2. Visually it is the same as a convex polygon.
At any α-level, the fuzzy number Ã can be represented in the interval form as follows:
Ã(α)=[a1(α), a2(α)]

(2.8)

where
Ã(α) is the fuzzy number at α-level;
a1(α) is the lower bound of the α-level interval; and
a2(α) is the upper bound of the α-level interval.
From here, the arithmetic operations of real numbers can be extended to the four main arithmetic
operations with fuzzy numbers, i.e. addition, subtraction, multiplication, and division. The fuzzy
operators of two fuzzy numbers Ã and B̃ are defined at any α-level cut as follows:
Ã(α) (+) B̃ (α)=[a1(α)+b1(α), a2(α)+b2(α)]
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(2.9)

Ã(α) (-) B̃ (α)=[a1(α)+b2(α), a2(α)-b1(α)]

(2.10)

Ã(α) (*) B̃ (α)=[a1(α)*b1(α), a2(α)*b2(α)]

(2.11)

Ã(α) (/) B̃ (α)=[a1(α)/b2(α), a2(α)/b1(α)]

(2.12)

Note that for multiplication and division:
(Ã (/) B̃ ) (*) B̃ ≠ Ã

(2.13)

Also true for addition and subtraction:
(Ã (-) B̃ ) (+) B̃ ≠ Ã

(2.14)

2.4.3. Mamdani inference system
Approximate or fuzzy reasoning involves combinations of imprecise logic rules into a single
management strategy. Fuzzy logic allows processing of fuzzy data and making decisions based on
inaccurate statements and inaccurate data (Ross, 2010). Because of these properties, fuzzy
inference approach is used in this work to model the operator’s decision making or control actions
in a hydropower dam system.
Following up from Zadeh’s approximate reasoning or fuzzy reasoning, a team from Queen Mary
College, London, the UK, led by Mamdani (1974) worked on many applications of approximate
reasoning for various industrial systems. Most famous is the fuzzy controller of a steam engine
and boiler. The fuzzy controller was based on a set of linguistic control rules obtained from
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experienced operators. Linguistic rules are representations of human knowledge in IF-THEN rule
- based form. Using rule-based simulation, the inference of a conclusion (consequent) given an
initially known fact (premise, hypothesis, antecedent) can be made (Ross, 2010). Typical form of
IF-THEN rule (also referred to as deductive form) is:
IF premise (antecedent), THEN conclusion (consequent)

(2.15)

Mamdani inference method is a graphical technique that follows five main steps:

1.

Development of fuzzy sets and linguistic rules.

2.

Fuzzification of inputs.

3.

Application of fuzzy operators.

4.

Aggregation of all outputs.

5.

Defuzzification of aggregated output.

Step 1. Development of fuzzy sets and linguistic rules
Fuzzy rules represent knowledge and experience of an experienced operator that controls certain
system, process, or performs a certain task. Rules are created through interview or observation of
the operator at work.

30

Mamdani form rules may be described by the collection of n linguistic IF-THEN expressions.
Following expression shows a rule for the fuzzy inference system with two noninteractive inputs
(antecedents) x1 and x2 and a single output (consequent) y:
IF x1 is A1 AND (OR) x2 is A2 THEN y is B

(2.16)

where A1, A2, and B are the fuzzy sets representing the antecedent pair and consequent. These
fuzzy sets may represent fuzzy linguistic concepts such as “large” or “small”, “hot” or “cold” and
so forth.
Step 2. Fuzzification of inputs
Inputs to the system, x1 and x2 are scalar values. In order to proceed with the inference method, the
corresponding degree to which the inputs belong to appropriate fuzzy sets via membership
functions needs to be found. Fuzzification of the input thus requires the membership function of
the fuzzy linguistic set to be created, and through function evaluation, the corresponding degree of
membership for the scalar input belonging to the universe of discourse is then found. This is
illustrated in Figure 10.
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Figure 10. Fuzzification of scalar input using created membership function
Step 3. Application of fuzzy operators
Since there is usually more than one input for a rule, fuzzy operators are used to obtain one number
that will represent premise for that rule. That number is applied to output function producing a
single truth value for the rule. Usually used logical operators are AND and OR for conjunctive and
disjunctive premises. For conjunctive premises we assume new fuzzy subset As as intersection:
𝐴𝑆𝑘 = 𝐴1𝑘 ∩ 𝐴𝑘2

for k=1,2, …, r

(2.17)

expressed using membership function:

𝜇𝐴𝑘𝑠 (𝑥) = min [𝜇𝐴𝑘1 , 𝜇𝐴𝑘2 ]

for k=1,2, …, r.

(2.18)

For disjunctive premises we assume a new fuzzy subset As as union:
𝐴𝑆𝑘 = 𝐴1𝑘 ∪ 𝐴𝑘2

for k=1,2, …, r
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(2.19)

expressed using membership function:

𝜇𝐴𝑘𝑠 (𝑥) = max [𝜇𝐴𝑘1 , 𝜇𝐴𝑘2 ]

for k=1,2, …, r.

(2.20)

Given the above, rule may be rewritten as:
IF 𝐴𝑆𝑘 THEN 𝐵𝑠𝑘 for k=1, 2, …, r

(2.21)

where r is the number of rules. Graphical representation of operators’ application is shown in
Figure 11.

Figure 11. Graphical representation of operators’ application
Step 4. Aggregation of outputs
Since it is common for fuzzy inference systems to have more than one rule aggregation of
individual consequents contributed by each rule is required, so that all outputs are combined into
a single fuzzy set that may be defuzzified in the final step to obtain a single scalar value.
There are two most often used ways of aggregating outputs, min-max truncation, and max-product
scaling, and former will be presented. Min-max truncation is the process of propagation of
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minimum or maximum membership function values from the premises (depending on the operator
in each rule) through to the consequent and in doing so truncating the membership function for the
consequent of each rule. Then, the truncated membership functions of each rule are combined.
That is achieved through the use of disjunctive or conjunctive rules using the same fuzzy operators
from the previous step. Disjunctive rules will be applied because of the nature of the inference
system. Rules cannot be combined conjunctively. For example, there is a no way to have two states
of hydrological data and consequences of those. We can have either one situation or another.
Therefore disjunctive rules are applied in this work. Aggregation of the rule outputs is shown in
Figure 12.

Figure 12. Aggregation of rule outputs into a single fuzzy membership function
Step 5. Defuzzification of aggregated result
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The objective of the rule-based system is typically to reach a single value obtained from the
defuzzification of the aggregated fuzzy set of all outputs. Defuzzification is the process, or method,
of extracting a single value from the aggregated fuzzy set. There are many defuzzification
methods: Max membership principle, centroid method, weighted average method and many others
(Simonović, 2009, Ross 2010, Teodorović, 2012). There is not one most suitable method,
depending on the shape of the premise, membership functions and problem under consideration,
an appropriate method should be selected. The centroid method is used in this project. It is also
referred to as the center of gravity, or center of an area. Its expression is given as:
𝑥𝑚𝑎𝑥

𝑦 ∗=

∫𝑥𝑚𝑖𝑛 𝜇(𝑥) ∗ 𝑥 𝑑𝑥
𝑥𝑚𝑎𝑥

(2.22)

∫𝑥𝑚𝑖𝑛 𝜇(𝑥)𝑑𝑥

Graphical representation of the centroid method is shown in Figure 13.

Figure 13. Defuzzification methods - centroid method result in red
An

overview

of

defuzzification

methods

is

available

online

http://www.mathworks.com/help/fuzzy/examples/defuzzification-methods.html (last viewed on
22/1/2016).
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STPA methodology and automatic generation of control flaws
In this section of the thesis, the STPA steps are explained using a generic dam system.
Additionally, formal specification for hazardous control actions (according to Thomas, 2012) and
use of system dynamics simulation and fuzzy inference system to automate the generation of
hazardous control actions, i.e., the scenarios for causing a hazard, are introduced.
System dynamics simulation method is introduced in this work as an implementation tool for
STPA. Control actions, which are assigned by the fuzzy inference system, and investigation of the
system states are achieved through system dynamics simulation. This procedure investigates all of
the possible scenarios in which the system may encounter a hazardous state.

3.1. Introduction to STPA
STPA is introduced using a simplified dam system. Assume a dam system that consists of an arch
dam with one spillway radial gate. Sensors read water level and relay information to operator’s
office that is located close to the dam. The operator manually controls the gate position. Hoist is
used for lifting and lowering the gate. Hoist is powered by electric power from the existing power
grid. Populated area is located downstream of the dam and reservoir is used for flood control.
Reservoir water level is controlled by planned releases achieved by the operation of the spillway
gate.
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Before beginning STPA hazard analysis, potential hazards need to be identified. Take for example
the previously described dam system Hazards in that simple system include:


H-1: Dam overtopping and destruction



H-2: Uncontrolled spill and downstream flooding

STPA Step One: The first step is to identify potentially unsafe control actions for the specific
system being considered that can lead to one or more defined system hazards. STPA is performed
on a functional control diagram. In this simple system, the control actions could be: open gate,
stop opening the gate, close gate, stop closing gate. Control actions can be documented using a
table like Table 1.
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Table 1: Potentially hazardous control actions for a simple gate controller
Control
Action

Gate open
command

1. Not given

2. Given incorrectly

3. Wrong timing of
order

4. Stopped too soon
or applied for too
long

Gate not open
when the water
level is high, and
inflow is high
(H1)

Gate open spilling
more than inflow (H2)

Gate open and there is
no risk of flooding
(H2)

Stopped too soon can
lead to (H1)

Gate not open to
release minimum
flow requirements

Gate is not closed
after flood event
is over leading to
(H2)
Gate close
command

Applied too long can
drain the reservoir
and cause (H2)
Gate not fully closed
leading to
unnecessary spilling
(may not be
hazardous)

Gate closed during
regular release. May
not be hazardous or
hazardous for
downstream river
ecosystem

Gate closed too soon
when water level is
high, and peak
inflow still has not
passed (H1)

Gate closed too soon,
but peak inflow
passed (may not be
hazardous)
STPA Step Two: The second step examines each control loop in the safety control structure to
identify potential causal factor for each hazardous control action, i.e., a scenario causing a hazard.
Figure 14 shows a generic control loop that can be used to guide this step.
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Figure 14. General control loop with causal factors (after Thomas, 2012)
Step one focuses on providing control actions while step two expands the analysis to consider
causal factors along the rest of the control loop (Thomas, 2012). For example, if the gate is closed
too soon, one of the causes may be the faulty feedback that controller received from the sensors.
Once the second step is over, and potential causes are determined for each hazardous control, they
should be eliminated or controlled in the design.
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3.2. Formal specification of the hazardous control actions
Thomas provided a formal specification of hazardous control actions that is used during step one
of STPA. This specification is used to develop an automated algorithm that assists in identifying
the actions and generating requirements that enforce safe behaviour (Thomas, 2012). Hazardous
control action in the STPA accident model can be expressed formally as a four-tuple (S, T, CA, C)
where:


S is a controller in the system that can issue control actions. The controller may be
automated or human.



T is the type of control action. There are two possible types: Provided describes a control
action that is issued by the controller while Not provided describes a control action that is
not issued.



CA is the control action or command that is output by the controller, like an Open gate.



C is the context in which the control action is or is not provided. Context C is further
decomposed into:
o V- a variable or attribute in the system or environment that may take on two or
more values. For example, water level and gate position are two potential variables
for a dam system.
o VL- a value that can be assumed by a variable. For example, closed is a value that
can be assumed by the variable gate position.
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o CO - a condition expressed as a single variable/value pair. For example, the gate is
closed a condition.


The context C is the combination of one or more conditions and defines a unique state of
the system or environment in which a control action may be given.



To qualify as a hazardous control action, the event (S, T, CA, C) must cause a hazard H ∈
H, where H is the set of system level hazards.

Each element of hazardous control action is a member of a larger set, i.e. the following properties
must hold:
S ∈ 𝓢

(3.1)

T ∈ 𝓣

(3.2)

CA ∈ 𝓒𝓐 (S)

(3.3)

where 𝒮 is the set of controllers in the system,

where 𝓣 = {Provided, Not Provided},

where 𝒞𝒜 (S) is the set of control actions that can be provided by controller S,
C ∈ 𝓒 (S)

(3.4)

where 𝒞 (S) is the set of potential contexts for controller S. Context is further decomposed into:
V ∈ 𝓥 (S)
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(3.5)

where 𝒱 (S) is the set of variables referenced in the system hazards 𝓗,
VL ∈ 𝓥ℒ (V)

(3.6)

where 𝒱𝓛 (V) is the set of values that can be assumed by variable V,
CO = (V, VL) ∈ 𝓒𝒪 (S)

(3.7)

where 𝒞𝓞 (S) is the set of conditions for controller S,
C = (CO1, CO2, . . . )

(3.8)

where each COi is independent. That is, no two COi refer to the same variable V.
Finally, each hazardous control must be linked to a system-level hazard:


Event (S, T, CA, C) must cause a hazard H ∈ 𝓗, where 𝓗 is the set of system hazards.

Using this formal specification is important for identifying hazardous control actions since the idea
is that some actions are only hazardous in certain contexts. For example, opening the spillway gate
is not hazardous by itself but in a certain context, it may be. Therefore, Thomas (2012) proposed
a procedure that involves identification of potential control actions (presented by S, T, CA),
potential hazardous states (presented by context C) and then analyzes which combinations yield a
hazardous control actions. Using formal specification, the following example (of the previously
described system) of the procedure is shown where action is expressed by following four-tuple:


S = Human



T = Not provided
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CA = open gate



C:
o V = Gate position, Water level, Inflows
o VL = Closed, Partially open, Fully open, Normal operating range, Above spillway
crest, Low, Normal, High
o CO = Gate is Closed, Gate is Partially open, Gate is Fully open, so forth (each
variable gets assigned a value, according to formal specification).

Results can be documented in tabular form. Table 2 shows context for the lack of an open gate
control action.
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Table 2: Contexts for the lack of an open gate control action

Control Action

Gate
position

Water level

Inflows

Hazardous if not
provided in this
context?

Gate open
command not
provided

Closed

Above spillway crest

High

Yes

Gate open
command not
provided

Closed

Above spillway crest

Normal

Yes*

Gate open
command not
provided

Closed

Above spillway crest

Low

No

Gate open
command not
provided

Closed

Normal operating range

(does not
matter)

No

Gate open
command not
provided

Partially
open

Above spillway crest

High

Yes*

Gate open
command not
provided

Partially
open

Above spillway crest

Normal

No

Gate open
command not
provided

Partially
open

Above spillway crest

Low

No

Gate open
command not
provided

Partially
open

Normal operating range

(does not
matter)

No

Gate open
command not
provided

Fully open

(does not matter)

(does not
matter)

No
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Values of the variables in the previous example are intentionally provided in the verbal form to
assist in the easy investigation if some actions are hazardous or not, depending on the context.
Control actions that might be hazardous depending on the values behind verbal phrases are marked
with an asterisk.

3.3. Implementation approach and computer programming
3.3.1. Generation of context
While the tabular presentation of actions and contexts is clear, another problem appears.
Hydropower dams are complex systems, and high level of detail is needed to achieve proper
analysis of the system, hazardous actions, and contexts (or scenarios). Therefore, contexts, C, will
be automatically generated. To explain further, each system and its components in the control loop,
hydrologic data, and disturbances are represented by several variables. Each variable, V, can have
several values, VL, from two (binary 0 and 1) to multiple values. For example, hydrologic inflow
has a range of values, from 0 or 1 m3/s to the value of probable maximum flood (PMF). Sets V1,
V2, …, Vn (where n is the number of variables) containing their values are multiplied using
Cartesian product to create all the possible combinations of variables and their respective values,
therefore creating all possible contexts:
𝑉1 = [ 𝑉𝐿11 , 𝑉𝐿12 , … , 𝑉𝐿1𝑚1 ]
𝑉2 = [𝑉𝐿21 , 𝑉𝐿22 , … , 𝑉𝐿2𝑚2 ]

(3.9)
(3.10)

.
.
𝑉𝑛 = [ 𝑉𝐿𝑛1 , 𝑉𝐿𝑛2 , … , 𝑉𝐿𝑛𝑚𝑙 ]
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(3.11)

where m1 is the number of values variable V1 can assume; m2 is the number of values variable V2
can assume, and ml is the number of values variable Vn can assume.
Following simple combinatorics:
|𝑆1 | ∙ |𝑆2 | ∙ … ∙ |𝑆𝑛 | = |𝑆1 × 𝑆2 × … × 𝑆𝑛 |

(3.12)

the context is then expressed as:
𝐶 = |𝑉1 × 𝑉2 × … × 𝑉𝑛 |

(3.13)

Automatic generation of the context has been achieved using Python programming language
(Python org. 2016). Variables and their values are written in a table. Python code is then run which
creates the table with complete context. The complete context table has m 1*m2*…*ml number of
rows and n columns.

3.3.2. Development of fuzzy inference system
In order to successfully apply fuzzy logic, one must previously generate fuzzy rule base and
determine shapes of membership functions. In a number of cases, membership functions are
initially determined subjectively by an expert, decision maker, or analyst. The subjective way of
determining membership functions is based on experience, intuition, and knowledge of the
particular domain. Most frequently, the final set of fuzzy rules and the final choice of shapes of
membership functions are determined by trial and error procedure (Ross, 2010). In other words,
the majority of fuzzy logic systems set up the parameters of the membership functions arbitrarily.
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This means, that the locations and spreads of the membership functions are chosen by the analyst
without the help of the numerical training data (Teodorovic, 2012).
To provide the necessary control actions for the procedure, Mamdani fuzzy inference system (FIS)
is created which describes operator decisions on how much to open (or close) the gate, depending
on the inflow and reservoir water level with guidance not to spill more than inflow. Fuzzy inference
systems like this are best created after series of interviews with experienced operators. For the
purpose of testing the methodology, FIS is created on the basis of hydraulic capability of the
spillway and guidelines for BC Hydro’s operators not to spill more than inflow until peak inflow
has passed. FIS consists of rules in the following format:
IF water level is “371” AND inflow is “1000”, THEN gate position is “2”

(3.14)

where “371” is the fuzzy set of reservoir elevation input, “1000” is the fuzzy set of inflow, and “2”
is the fuzzy set of gate position output. Complete set of rules is shown in Appendix A. Input
membership functions for both inputs (reservoir elevation and inflow), and outputs are triangular
functions. Examples of the membership functions of the input and output fuzzy sets created based
on spillway capability are shown in Figures 15, 16 and 17.

47

Figure 15. Membership functions of reservoir elevation fuzzy sets for the FIS.
The vertical axis is the degree of membership (from 0 to 1), and the horizontal axis is the reservoir
elevation in meters above sea level.

Figure 16. Membership functions of inflow fuzzy sets for the FIS.
The vertical axis is the degree of membership (from 0 to 1), and the horizontal axis is the inflow
in m3/s.
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Figure 17. Membership functions of gate position fuzzy sets for the FIS
The vertical axis is the degree of membership, from 0 to 1. The horizontal axis is the gate position
relative to the spillway sill, from 0 meters (closed) to 12 meters (fully opened).
Fuzzy sets usually have descriptive names, like “low”, “medium”, “high” but in this context, the
number just represents closeness to that value. For example, inflow of 490 m3/s will have very
high degree of membership to “500” and very low degree of membership to “400”.

3.3.3. System dynamics simulation model
System state cannot be assessed from a single moment in time or single context and control action.
System dynamics simulation model has been developed to investigate the behaviour of the
hydropower dam system. The model is able to represent the system components, component
interactions and control actions. The structure of the model used in the simulation is shown in
Figure 18 using stock and flow diagram.
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Figure 18. Stock and flow diagram of the hydropower dam system
Inflow and Outflow are the “flows”, Reservoir Storage is the system stock. Other components are
known as system variables.
The reservoir storage (volume of the water in the reservoir) accumulates or integrates the flows:
𝑡

𝑅𝑆(𝑡) = ∫ [𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑜𝑤(𝑠) − 𝑂𝑢𝑡𝑓𝑙𝑜𝑤(𝑠)]𝑑𝑠 + 𝑅𝑆(𝑡0 )
𝑡0
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(3.15)

where RS(t) is the reservoir storage in current time t in m3, Inflow(s) is the value of the inflow at
any time s between the initial time t0 and the current time t in m3/s, Outflow(s) is the value of the
outflow at any time s between the initial time t0 and current time t in m3/s, and RS(t0) is the reservoir
storage at initial time t0 in m3. The net rate of reservoir storage change can be presented by its
derivative:
𝑑(𝑅𝑆)
= 𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑜𝑤(𝑡) − 𝑂𝑢𝑡𝑓𝑙𝑜𝑤(𝑡)
𝑑𝑡

(3.16)

The ordinary differential equation (1.2) is the basis of the system dynamics simulation. Euler
integration is the most basic numerical integration method. Applying Euler integration and
assuming constant flows during the time interval (3.16) transforms to:
𝑅𝑆𝑡+𝑑𝑡 = 𝑅𝑆𝑡 + 𝑑𝑡 × (𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑡 − 𝑂𝑢𝑡𝑓𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑡 )

(3.17)

where dt is the time interval interval between simulation time steps. When dt becomes an
infinitesimal moment of time, equation (3.17) reduces to the exact continuous-time differential
equation:
lim 𝑆𝑡+𝑑𝑡 − 𝑆𝑡

𝑑𝑡→0

𝑑𝑡

=

𝑑𝑆
= 𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑡 − 𝑂𝑢𝑡𝑓𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑡
𝑑𝑡

(3.18)

Analytical and numerical solution of the differential equation vary because of the size of dt. Based
on the usual dam operation and hourly inflow data available, time step of 1 hour is selected.
Equation (3.17) becomes:
𝑅𝑆𝑡+1 = 𝑅𝑆𝑡 + ∆𝑡 × (𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑡 − 𝑂𝑢𝑡𝑓𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑡 )
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(3.19)

where RSt+1 is the reservoir storage in the next time step, RSt is the reservoir storage in the current
time step t, Δt is the time step of 1 hour, Inflowt is the value of the inflow in the current time step,
and Outflowt is the value of the outflow in the current time step t. Outflowt is a sum of following
outflows:
𝑆𝑃𝑂𝑢𝑡𝑓𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑡 = 𝑓(𝐺𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑡 , 𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑜𝑖𝑟 𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑡 )

(3.20)

𝑃𝐼𝑂𝑢𝑡𝑓𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑡 = 𝑓(𝑃𝐼𝑡 , 𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑜𝑖𝑟 𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑡 )

(3.21)

𝐿𝐿𝑂𝑂𝑢𝑡𝑓𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑡 = 𝑓(𝐺𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑡 , 𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑜𝑖𝑟 𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑡 )

(3.22)

𝑂𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑡 = 𝑓(𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑜𝑖𝑟 𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑡 )

(3.23)

where Gate positiont is the position of the main spillway gate in the current time step t, Reservoir
elevationt is the elevation of the reservoir water surface elevation in the current time step t in meters
above sea level, PIt is the position of the power intake gate in the current time step t, LLOt is the
position of the low – level outlet gate in the current time step t. SPOutflowt is the spillway outflow
in current time step t, PIOutflowt is power intake (intake from the reservoir, outflow through the
turbines) in the current time step t, LLOOutflowt is the low – level outlet outflow in the current
time step t, and Overflowingt is the overflowing of the reservoir free crest weirs, emergency ports
and the dam itself. Therefore, Outflowt is:
𝑂𝑢𝑡𝑓𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑡 = 𝑆𝑃𝑂𝑢𝑡𝑓𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑡 + 𝑃𝐼𝑂𝑢𝑡𝑓𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑡 + 𝐿𝐿𝑂𝑂𝑢𝑡𝑓𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑡 + 𝑂𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑡
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(3.24)

SPOutflowt is evaluated from the spillway discharge curve. An example of spillway discharge
curve is shown in Figure 19.

CHEAKAMUS DAM: Radial Gate No. 1 (Left) Discharge Curves
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Figure 19. An example of the spillway gate discharge curve (after Kong, 2013)
The horizontal axis is the discharge under the spillway gate in m3/s. Gate position is presented with
series of curves. The vertical axis is the reservoir elevation in meters above sea level. Each of the
Outflowt components is evaluated in the same way, using corresponding hydraulic curves.
Reservoir elevation is evaluated from the stage – storage curve. An example of stage – storage
curve is shown in Figure 20.
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Figure 20. An example of the stage - storage curve
The horizontal axis is the volume in millions of m3 and the vertical axis is the reservoir water
surface elevation in meters above sea level.
Spillway gate position, power intake gate position, and low – level outlet gate position change in
every time step based on the operational rules and system variables. Relationships between system
variables, gate operational rules and gate positions can be very complex.
System variable conditions are stored in the automatically generated context. Variables used in the
simulation are reservoir volume, inflow, spillway gate position, hoist condition, steel rope
condition, structural gate condition, hydraulic ram condition (low – level gate actuator), power
intake gate condition, main grid availability, backup power generator availability, backup batteries
availability, sensors condition, sensor relay system condition, human presence, debris and
landslide. Variables used in the model are shown in Figures 21 and 22.
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Figure 21. Cross section of a spillway section of a dam with system variables (U.S. Army Corps
of Engineers, 29/11/2015.)
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Figure 22. Dam and reservoir diagram with system variables (Summit Hydropower, Inc. 2015)
Starting conditions of the simulated system are represented by the variables from the context.
Therefore, depending on the other variables, negative state of one variable will not necessarily
mean that system is in a hazardous state. For example, if a gate cannot be opened, or due to faulty
sensors operator decides not to open the gate, depending on the water level and inflow no harm
may happen to the dam in the following hours. That time might be enough to eliminate the fault,
or repair the critical system component.
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Simulation software tools offer an intuitive interface for simulation model creation. However, this
procedure was implemented in the MATLAB® (Matworks.com, 2016) software because of easy
implementation of fuzzy interface system in the simulation model.
A continuous simulation approach is used for the determination of reservoir storage. Inputs for the
simulation are (a) all the variables from the context; (b) storage curve, gate discharge curve and
free crest weirs discharge curve; (c) FIS; and (d) simulation time horizon. The simulation time step
is 1 hour. Data preparation and simulation flowchart is shown in Figure 23.
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Figure 23. Simulation modelling procedure
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The landslide impact is assessed at the beginning of each simulation step. If the volume of the
landslide mass is significant compared to the reservoir size, the dam may be overtopped regardless
of the dam state. Therefore, the simulation may end after landslide impact analysis. If that is not
the case, next, the sensors are inspected. Availability of the sensor components is inspected
because it influences operator’s decisions. Fuzzy inference model based on information from the
sensors provides operator’s decision (shown in Figure 24).

Figure 24. Pseudocode for sensors inspection and operator's decision (CWL - current water level
or the reservoir elevation; IN - inflow)
After the operator’s decision is determined, the state of the actuators and flow control system (gate)
is investigated. The actuator system is divided in (a) power source: main power grid, backup
generators (gasoline or diesel) and backup batteries; (b) mechanical component, the actual hoist
machine and steel cable that lifts or lowers the gates; and (c) structural component, gate and its
training wall and trunnions. State of the actuators and gates is determined and if possible, issued
control action is performed. Using discharge curves (gate discharge, and free crest discharge)
spillway and free crest discharge are calculated. Simulation revolves around single equation, based
on (3.19):
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𝑅𝑆𝑡+1 = 𝑅𝑆𝑡 + 3600 × (𝐼𝑁𝑡 − 𝑆𝑃𝑂𝑡 − 𝑃𝐼𝑂𝑡 − 𝐿𝐿𝑂𝑂𝑡 − 𝑂𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑡 )

(3.25)

where INt is the inflow in the current time step t, SPOt is the spillway gate outflow in the current
time step t, PIOt is the power intake in the current time step t, LLOOt is the low-level outlet outflow
in the current time step t, and Overflowingt is the free crests spill. It is assumed that there are no
losses due to infiltration, leakage, and evaporation. At the end of each step, if the water level is
higher than certain free crest weir and/or dam crest it means context is recorded in the output file
and simulation ends since it reached hazardous state. Simulation runs until it reaches time horizon
or until water level overtops free crest weirs and/or dam. Simulation is repeated for every
combination of the starting conditions of the system.
Since water level change is simulated, only water level and gate position (if possible) change
through the simulation. It is assumed that other system components’ state (like sensors or hoist)
cannot or do not change through the simulation. If the state of a system component can change in
a short amount of time, that state of the system is described by another combination of variable
values (“row” of context). Therefore, nothing is omitted from the final result.
The simulation is repeated for each combination of the variable values i.e. for each “row” of the
context. This means that simulation is run j times for k hours, where j is the number of different
combinations of variable values and k is the chosen simulation time horizon. Simulation time step
is 1 hour.
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3.4. Data
Because of the reservoir problem structure (components and their interactions), a lot of data is
needed for model simulation.


Hydrologic inflow data. The range of inflows from minimum to maximum inflow
(probable maximum flood).



Hydraulic data. Reservoir storage curve, spillway gate discharge curve, free crest and
overtopping spill curves.



Technical data: Information on actuator systems, power systems, sensors, and gates.



Structural data: Locations of all the system components and their structure



Geologic data: Landslide existence and their probable mass.

It is important to get the accurate hydrologic and hydraulic data for the simulation to have a
realistic representation of the dam system and its behaviour. In order to have a clear picture of the
state variables and connections between system components and how they influence each other,
accurate mechanical and structural data is needed. If available, controller’s experience can
facilitate the development of fuzzy inference system.

Analysis and Results of Cheakamus Dam Case Study
The developed methodology has been implemented on a system based on the Cheakamus Dam in
British Columbia. Cheakamus Dam is an earth dam with a concrete section where all the outlets
are. It has several outlet structures including two 35 ft x 40 ft hoist operated spillway radial gates,
lower level outlet gate, a hollow cone valve and three free crest weirs. A system dynamics
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simulation model, presented ins Section 3.3, is based on the Cheakamus dam. The system
representation has been simplified for model testing by combining radial gates into a single rating
curve. Hollow cone is not incorporated in the model. All of the data has been provided by BC
Hydro in the following documents: Local Operating Order 3G-CMS-06 (Wood, 2009) and
Operations, Maintenance and Surveillance Manual for Dam Safety and Generation Operating
Order CMS 4G-25 v2.2 (Oswell, 2009). Hazards that were investigated in this study are:
(H-1): Earth dam overtopping and destruction
(H-2): Uncontrolled spill over three separate free crest weirs (with same crest elevations).
Other hazards, like uncontrolled spill and downstream flooding, are not yet incorporated in the
model.
The dam cross sections are shown in Figures 25, 26, and 27.

Figure 25. Spillway cross section – Cheakamus Dam (BC Hydro, 2009)
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Figure 26. Upstream face of the concrete dam – Cheakamus Dam (BC Hydro, 2009)

Figure 27. Cheakamus Dam earth fill cross – section (BC Hydro, 2009)

Figures 28, 29, and 30 show hydraulic capabilities of the main spillway, low level outlet gate and
overflow facilities. Figure 31 shows the stage – storage curve for the Cheakamus Dam reservoir.
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Figure 28. Spillway discharge curve for both spillway gates – Cheakamus dam (after Kong,
2013)

Figure 29. Discharge curve for low level outlet gate – Cheakamus dam (after Kong, 2013)
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Figure 30. Discharge curves for overflow facilities – Cheakamus dam (after Kong, 2013)

Figure 31. Stage – storage curve for the reservoir (after Matheson, 2005)
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Variables and values used in Cheakamus Dam case study are shown in Tables 3 and 4.
Table 3: Input data for the Cheakamus Dam case study, part 1
Reservoir
Inflow(m3/s) volume(m3)

Gate
Position

Sensor
state

Main
Debris(m) grid

Diesel
generator

Batteries

1

5000000

0

0

0

0

0

0

100

10000000

1

1

1

1

1

1

300

15000000

3

2

2

500

20000000

5

700

25000000

7

900

30000000

9

1000

35000000

10

1500

40000000

11

2000

45000000

12

2500

50000000

3000

55000000

3500
4000
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Table 4: Input data for the Cheakamus Dam case study, part 2

Steel
Cable

Hoist

Gate structural
condition

Sensor
Relay

Power
Intake
LLOG
Gate
condition condition

Stuff
Presence

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

2
Water inflow (Table 3, column 1) is the only “input” to the reservoir. Direct precipitation and
melting snow are included in the inflow values. Inflow range from a minimum of 1 m3/s (can be
changed to zero) to probable maximum flood (PMF) that is according to BC Hydro data 4,129
m3/s. That number has since the year of 2003 been updated to a range between 2,300 and 2,900
m3/s. PMF of 4,000 m3/s is kept as the maximum flow in this case study. The reason for the update
of PMF is not available. As seen in Table 3, column 1, inflow has 13 different values in the
mentioned range. These values have been selected as representative and have smaller increments
under 1000 m3/s since historical daily maximum inflow value between years 1960 and 2000 was
648 m3/s.
The lowest starting reservoir volume (storage) value used is 5,000,000 m3 which corresponds to
Cheakamus Dam water licence lower storage level (Wood, 2009) of 366.5 m. The highest starting
reservoir volume used is 55,000,000 m3 which corresponds to reservoir elevation of 380.7 m. This
elevation is above overflow facilities but below Cheakamus Dam crest elevation. This starting
condition is already a hazard since the overflow facilities are overtopped. This range of starting
reservoir values was chosen to test whether the system can recover from H-2 hazard. Variables
used for starting reservoir storage can be seen in Table 3 column 2.
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Starting gate position is physically restricted to 12 meters, so the range is from 0 to 12 meters with
increments of 1 to 2 meters. It is assumed that gate can be in any position at the start of the
simulation. Starting gate position values are showed in Table 3 column 3.
Debris is assumed to create an impermeable block at the bottom of the spillway. If debris boom
breaks, depending on the season, it is assumed that tree trunks and branches get stuck in the
spillway and create an impermeable wall. According to the BC Hydro data, there have not been
records of more than 1 meter of debris getting accumulated in the spillway, so 2 meters of
maximum debris blockage is used to be on the safe side. Debris values are shown in Table 3
column 5.
Due to the lack of geologic and geomorphologic data, it is assumed that the landslide affects only
the volume in the reservoir and that the whole land mass does not hit the surface of the water too
fast (does not create big waves). Landslide volumes in the BC Hydro data are 300,000 m3 (that
happened in the 20th century), 15,000,000 m3 (half of the historical maximum), and 30,000,000 m3
(the historical maximum which did hit the Cheakamus River area in the 19th century). It has been
found that these extreme values of landslide volume (compared to reservoir volume) skew the
results, therefore landslide impact analysis is not present in the case study.
Availability of power source (Table 3, columns 6-8) and mechanical equipment (Table 4 columns
1 and 2) is implemented in a binary form, 0 or 1, not available or available. It is assumed that staff
(Table 4, column 5) can arrive at the site in less than an hour or approximately one hour if the need
arises (for example, if the sensor relay is not working). It is also assumed that in an additional hour
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staff can determine the rate of rise (of reservoir level) and start controlling the gates manually
(from the control station on site).
More information is needed on how sensors (Table 3, columns 4) work and how exactly software
for monitoring sensor output is working to improve the system dynamics simulation model.
Reservoir elevation sensors can have three states: (a) 1, the sensors are functioning properly and
displaying correct elevation, (b) 0, the sensors are not working and (c) 2, the sensors are
malfunctioning and are displaying elevation lower for 1 meter than the real reservoir elevation,
therefore negatively influence controller’s decision – making. Sensor relay (Table 4, column 4)
transmits the reservoir elevation data to a remote controller. The relay can either function properly
(1) or malfunction (0) and not transmit any data to the remote operator. It is assumed that system
is controlled remotely. Therefore, if the relay is not functioning properly, and the local operator is
not on site, no control action can be taken.
Reservoir management and planning is not part of the model, and there is insufficient data on the
operation of low – level outlet gate. Low – level outlet gate (LLOG, Table 4, column 6) and
power intake gate(Table 4, column 7) operation have been simplified in the presented study. LLOG
is used if the spillway gates malfunction or if the inflow is greater than the spillway discharge
capacity. LLOG is fully open in both cases. The power intake gate has the smallest flow capacity
and is also used only if the spillway gates malfunction or if the inflow is greater than the spillway
discharge capacity.
For some variables, value increment might be significant. The increment value should be selected
to provide accurate results i.e. to cover all of the possible conditions. For now, one of the
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limitations is the physical computer memory, simply because of the size of the input data that has
to be stored and accessed during simulation. Another important point is that there are simply too
many iterations to go through depending on the size of the context.

4.1. Computer implementation
A simplified flowchart of the computational procedure applied to the Cheakamus Dam case study
is shown in Figure 30.

Figure 32. Programming flowchart
Variables and values are stored in a spreadsheet. From these variables and their values, using
context generator (described in the Python code – Appendix B), the full context for STPA is
generated. Simulation is done using MATLAB software (Mathworks, 2015) and code is presented
in Appendix C. Since the product of the number of variable values is 17,791,488
(13*11*9*3*3*2*2*2*2*2*3*2*2*2*2), that is the number of rows of the context. Therefore, 1hour time step, 3-hour time horizon simulations have been repeated 17,791,488 times, each time
with different starting conditions. Time horizon of 3 hours has been selected because of the long
duration of the computing time. Part of the generated context is shown in Table 5. The notation
used in Table 5 includes:
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Table 5: Part of the Cheakamus case study context (the first nine rows)
IN RV

GP Sens Debris MG DG BAT Hoist Cable GSC

SR SP LLOG

PG

1 5*106

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

1 5*106

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

1

1 5*106

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

1

0

1 5*106

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

1

1

1 5*106

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

1

0

0

1 5*106

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

1

0

1

1 5*106

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

1

1

0

1 5*106

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

1

1

1

1 5*106

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

1

0

0

0

IN as the inflow (same in each time step), RV as the starting reservoir volume, GP as the starting
spillway gate position, Sens as the reservoir elevation sensor condition, Debris as the amount of
debris accumulated in the spillway, MG as the availability of the main grid, DG as the availability
of the diesel generator, and BAT as the availability of backup batteries. Hoist and Cable represent
the state of the hoist – cable mechanism. GSC is the spillway gate structural condition. SR is the
condition of the sensor relay system. SP is the staff presence. LLOG is the condition of the low level outlet gate. PG is the condition of the power intake gate.
Results of the procedure are recorded in two separate spreadsheets. One spreadsheet records each
starting combination of variable values and controller’s decision throughout the simulation that
resulted in a hazard (both H-1 and H-2, discussed at the beginning of Chapter 4). Another
spreadsheet records the hourly changes of the reservoir storage in each of the 17,791,488
simulations.
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4.2. Justification for the use of fuzzy rules
An experiment was conducted to compare spillway gate operation and reservoir elevation changes
when fuzzy rules and crisp rules are used for control actions. Two simple system dynamics
simulation models based on the Cheakamus dam are developed and used for the experiment.
Historical hourly inflow data is used as input to the both models. Inflow data was provided by BC
Hydro from one of the events recorded at Cheakamus Dam. Inflow hydrograph of the event is
shown in Figure 33.

Figure 33. Cheakamus Dam historical inflow hydrograph
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4.2.1. Fuzzy rules (FIS) example
System dynamics simulation model structure is shown in Figure 34.

Figure 34. Stock and flow diagram of the Cheakamus Dam System with fuzzy rules
Reservoir storage (volume of water in the reservoir) accumulates or integrates the flows:
𝑡

𝑅𝑆(𝑡) = ∫ [𝐻𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑙 𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑜𝑤(𝑠) − 𝑂𝑢𝑡𝑓𝑙𝑜𝑤(𝑠)]𝑑𝑠 + 𝑅𝑆(𝑡0 )

(4.1)

𝑡0

where RS(t) is the reservoir storage in current time t in m3, Historical inflow(s) is the value of the
inflow at any time s between the initial time t0 and the current time t in m3/s, Outflow(s) is the
value of the outflow at any time s between the initial time t0 and current time t in m3/s, and RS(t0)
is the reservoir storage at initial time t0 in m3. The net rate of reservoir storage change can be
presented by its derivative:
𝑑(𝑅𝑆)
= 𝐻𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑙 𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑜𝑤(𝑡) − 𝑂𝑢𝑡𝑓𝑙𝑜𝑤(𝑡)
𝑑𝑡
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(4.2)

The ordinary differential equation (4.2) is the basis of the system dynamics simulation. The Euler
method is used for the numerical integration:
𝑅𝑆𝑡+1 = 𝑅𝑆𝑡 + ∆𝑡 × (𝐻𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑙 𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑡 − 𝑂𝑢𝑡𝑓𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑡 )

(4.3)

where RSt+1 is the reservoir storage in the next time step, RSt is the reservoir storage in the current
time step t, Δt is the time step of 1 hour, Historical inflowt is the value of the inflow in the current
time step, and Outflowt is the value of the outflow in the current time step t. Outflow is a function
of reservoir elevation and spillway gate position:
𝑂𝑢𝑡𝑓𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑡 = 𝑓(𝐺𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑡 , 𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑜𝑖𝑟 𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑡 )

(4.4)

where Gate positiont is the position of the spillway gate in the current time step t and Reservoir
elevationt is the elevation of the reservoir water surface in the current time step t in meters above
sea level. Outflow is evaluated from the spillway discharge curve shown in Figure 35.
CHEAKAMUS DAM: Radial Gate No. 1 (Left) Discharge Curves
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Figure 35. Spillway discharge curve for spillway gate #1 – Cheakamus dam (after Kong, 2013)
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Reservoir elevation is evaluated from the stage – storage curve (see Figure 31 for Cheakamus Dam
reservoir stage – storage curve).
Gate position in each time step is determined using control action rules. The proposed FIS belongs
to the class Mamdani fuzzy inference systems. The goal of the fuzzy rules is to keep the reservoir
at the same elevation as starting elevation, without discharging more than the inflow. Therefore,
the goal of the FIS is to match the outflow value to the inflow value. The FIS achieves that goal
by control of the gate position. The FIS has two inputs, inflow and reservoir elevation, and one
output, gate position, as shown in Figure 36.

Figure 36. Fuzzy inference system inputs and outputs
The inputs and output fuzzy sets and membership functions were created on the basis of hydraulic
capability of the spillway, similarly to Cheakamus Dam case study. Membership functions of the
inflow fuzzy sets are shown in Figure 37.
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Figure 37. Membership functions of inflow fuzzy sets for the FIS. The vertical axis is the degree
of membership (from 0 to 1), and the horizontal axis is the inflow in m3/s.
Membership functions of the reservoir elevation fuzzy sets are shown in Figure 38.

Figure 38. Membership functions of reservoir elevation fuzzy sets for the FIS. The vertical axis
is the degree of membership (from 0 to 1), and the horizontal axis is the reservoir elevation in
meters above sea level.

Membership functions of gate position fuzzy sets are shown in Figure 39.
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Figure 39. Membership functions of gate output fuzzy sets for the FIS. The vertical axis is the
degree of membership (from 0 to 1), and the horizontal axis is the gate opening in meters.
FIS has following fuzzy rule base:
IF inflow is very low AND RЕ is low THEN gate position is 0

(4.5)

OR

IF inflow is very low AND RЕ is medium THEN gate position is 0

(4.6)

OR

IF inflow is very low AND RЕ is high THEN gate position is 0

(4.7)

OR

IF inflow is low AND RЕ is low THEN gate position is 1

(4.8)

OR

IF inflow is low AND RЕ is medium THEN gate position is 0.5

(4.9)

OR

IF inflow is low AND RЕ is high THEN gate position is 0.5

(4.10)

OR

IF inflow is medium AND RЕ is low THEN gate position is 2

(4.11)

OR

IF inflow is medium AND RЕ is medium THEN gate position is 1.5

(4.12)
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OR

IF inflow is medium AND RЕ is high THEN gate position is 1

(4.13)

OR

IF inflow is high AND RE is low THEN gate position is 3

(4.14)

OR

IF inflow is high AND RE is medium THEN gate position is 2

(4.15)

OR

IF inflow is high AND RE is high THEN gate position is 1.5

(4.16)

OR

IF inflow is very high AND RE is low THEN gate position is 3

(4.17)

OR

IF inflow is very high AND RE is medium THEN gate position is 3

(4.18)

OR

IF inflow is very high AND RE is high THEN gate position is 2

(4.19)

Historical info provided was for an event that lasted 214 hours. Therefore, simulation time horizon
is 214 hours and simulation time step is 1 hour. Starting reservoir storage is 14,798,916 m3
corresponding to reservoir elevation of 370 meters above sea level. Simulation is done using
MATLAB® software, and the code is included in Appendix D.
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4.2.2. Crisp rules example
System dynamics simulation model structure is shown in Figure 40.

Figure 40. Stock and flow diagram of the Cheakamus Dam system with crisp operational rules.
This structure is similar to the structure used in the previous example and equations (4.1) to (4.4)
are also used in this model. Outflow is evaluated from the spillway discharge curve (see Figure 35
for Cheakamus Dam spillway discharge curve). Reservoir elevation is evaluated from the stage –
storage curve (see Figure 31 for Cheakamus Dam reservoir stage – storage curve).
Gate position in each time step is determined using crisp control action rules. The goal of the crisp
rules is to match the outflow value to the inflow value. This is achieved by control of the gate
position. The crisp rules have two inputs, inflow and reservoir elevation, and one output, gate
position. The input inflow value can be a member of one of following sets:
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"0" = {𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑜𝑤 ∈ 𝐻𝐼|0 ≤ 𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑜𝑤 ≤ 25}

(4.20)

"50" = {𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑜𝑤 ∈ 𝐻𝐼|25 < 𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑜𝑤 ≤ 75}

(4.21)

"100" = {𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑜𝑤 ∈ 𝐻𝐼|75 < 𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑜𝑤 ≤ 125}

(4.22)

"150" = {𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑜𝑤 ∈ 𝐻𝐼|125 < 𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑜𝑤 ≤ 175}

(4.23)

"200" = {𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑜𝑤 ∈ 𝐻𝐼|175 < 𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑜𝑤 ≤ 200}

(4.24)

where “0”, “50”, “100”, “150”, and “200” are the inflow sets and HI is the set of all inflow values
from the historical data. Since these are crisp sets, degree of membership of each element of these
sets is always 1. Membership functions of inflow sets are shown in Figure 41.

Figure 41. Membership functions of inflow sets for the crisp rules. The vertical axis is the degree
of membership (from 0 to 1), and the horizontal axis is the inflow in m3/s.
The reservoir elevation value can be a member of one of following sets:
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𝑅𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒 1 = {𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑜𝑖𝑟 𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 ∈ 𝑅𝐸𝑅|367.28 < 𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑜𝑖𝑟 𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 < 372}

(4.25)

𝑅𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒 2 = {𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑜𝑖𝑟 𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 ∈ 𝑅𝐸𝑅|372 ≤ 𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑜𝑖𝑟 𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 < 375}

(4.26)

𝑅𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒 3 = {𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑜𝑖𝑟 𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 ∈ 𝑅𝐸𝑅|375 ≤ 𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑜𝑖𝑟 𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 ≤ 377}

(4.27)

where, Range 1, Range 2, and Range 3 are the reservoir elevation sets and RER is the set of all
reservoir elevations between 367.28 meters above sea level and 377 meters above sea level.
Membership functions of these sets are shown in Figure 42.

Figure 42. Membership functions of reservoir elevation sets for the crisp rules. The vertical axis
is the degree of membership (from 0 to 1), and the horizontal axis is the reservoir elevation in
meters above sea level.

The output of the crisp rules are singletons, sets with exactly one element. Gate position output
can be one of the following sets:
"0.5" = {0.5}
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(4.28)

"1" = {1}

(4.29)

"1.5" = {1.5}

(4.30)

"2" = {2}

(4.31)

"3" = {3}

(4.32)

Membership functions of these sets are shown in Figure 43.

Figure 43. Membership functions of gate position sets for the crisp rules. The vertical axis is the
degree of membership (from 0 to 1), and the horizontal axis is the gate position in meters.

Following crisp control action rules are used:
IF inflow ∈ “0” AND RE ∈ Range 1 THEN gate position = 0

(4.33)

ELSE IF inflow ∈ “0” AND RE ∈ Range 2 THEN gate position = 0

(4.34)
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ELSE IF inflow ∈ “0” AND RE ∈ Range 3 THEN gate position = 0

(4.35)

ELSE IF inflow ∈ “50” AND RE ∈ Range 1 THEN gate position = 1

(4.36)

ELSE IF inflow ∈ “50” AND RE ∈ Range 2 THEN gate position = 0.5

(4.37)

ELSE IF inflow ∈ “50” AND RE ∈ Range 3 THEN gate position = 0.5

(4.38)

ELSE IF inflow ∈ “100” AND RE ∈ Range 1 THEN gate position = 2

(4.39)

ELSE IF inflow ∈ “100” AND RE ∈ Range 2 THEN gate position = 1.5

(4.40)

ELSE IF inflow ∈ “100” AND RE ∈ Range 3 THEN gate position = 1

(4.41)

ELSE IF inflow ∈ “150” AND RE ∈ Range 1 THEN gate position = 3

(4.42)

ELSE IF inflow ∈ “150” AND RE ∈ Range 2 THEN gate position = 2

(4.43)

ELSE IF inflow ∈ “150” AND RE ∈ Range 3 THEN gate position = 1.5

(4.44)

ELSE IF inflow ∈ “200” AND RE ∈ Range 1 THEN gate position = 3

(4.45)

ELSE IF inflow ∈ “200” AND RE ∈ Range 2 THEN gate position = 3

(4.46)

ELSE IF inflow ∈ “200” AND RE ∈ Range 3 THEN gate position = 2

(4.47)

The structure of the crisp rules is similar to the fuzzy rules, but different sets are used in the two
examples. The simulation time horizon is 214 hours and simulation time step is 1 hour. Starting
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reservoir storage is 14,798,916 m3 corresponding to reservoir elevation of 370 meters above sea
level. Simulation is done using MATLAB® software, and the code is included in Appendix E.

4.2.3. Comparative analysis of the results
Depending on control action rules, the gate position will change in each time step. Gate position
changes from both systems are shown in Figure 44.

Figure 44. Cheakamus Dam spillway gate operation (blue – simulated using fuzzy control action
rules; red – simulated using crisp control action rules)
Fuzzy control action rules result in a much smoother gate operation. Gate position is changed every
time step, but in small increments, usually several centimeters. In contrast to that, gate operation
using crisp control action rules results in a “choppy” gate operation. The gate alternates between
two positions several times in a matter of hours. This kind of gate operation is highly impractical,
unsafe, and impossible depending on the rate of gate movement. Additionally, sudden changes in
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gate position of this range may wear down the mechanical equipment and lead to the failure of the
gate actuator systems. The rate of the Cheakamus Dam spillway gate movement is not available.
Shorter time step cannot be used with the hourly historical inflow data. Gate operation using crisp
rules might be even more erratic with shorter time step. From gate operation point of view, the use
of fuzzy rules results in better control actions.
Simulated reservoir storage is transformed to reservoir elevation (using stage – storage curve), and
the results from both examples are shown in Figure 45.

Figure 45. Cheakamus reservoir elevation changes (blue – simulated using crisp control action
rules; red – simulated using fuzzy control action rules)
Reservoir elevation levels are similar in both examples. Both sets of control action rules satisfy
the goal of keeping the reservoir elevation close to the starting reservoir elevation at the end of the
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event. Fuzzy control action rules result in smoother reservoir elevation changes. Example using
the crisp control action rules shows lower reservoir elevations, which from the dam safety point
of view is a better result. However, the lower reservoir elevations in the second example are
achieved with impractical and unsafe gate operation, thus invalidating the result.

4.3. Results and the discussion
The results of the system dynamics simulations are automatically saved in a spreadsheet and are
ready to be analyzed. Result include hourly reservoir storage values. The reservoir volume is of
main concern, together with its change through time and its relationship with the state of other
system components and control actions. The Cheakamus Dam model presented in this thesis can
show how components interact and how the lack of safe control action might not always result in
a hazardous state for the reservoir. Sometimes, external disturbance may be too large for the system
as it is designed. Millions of combinations of variable values or context “rows” provide an answer
to an important question: what happens if something changes during the simulation time. The
answer is in the robustness of the presented methodology. If the state of a system component
changes in a short period of time, that state of the system is described in another combination of
variable values (“row” of context). Therefore, no potential hazardous state is omitted from the final
results. All of the physically possible values of the 15 variables are already in the context.
Results were analyzed and several scenarios are selected for visual presentation in the following
subsections.
Following scenarios are presented:
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Scenario 1: Spillway gates closed and cannot be opened



Scenario 2: Spillway gates open and stuck 1 meter above the spillway sill



Scenario 3: Spillway gates open and stuck 3 meters above the spillway sill



Scenario 4: Spillway gates open and stuck 5 meters above the spillway sill



Scenario 5: LLOG closed and not functioning



Scenario 6: Power intake gate closed and not functioning

Scenarios obviously do not cover the whole context, but just some of the combinations of variable
values. The goal of these scenarios is to determine if a certain failure will lead to a hazardous state,
depending on the context in which the failure happened. These six scenarios were selected as the
spillway gates, LLOG and power intake gate are the critical components of the hydropower dam
system. Without them, outflow control and reservoir operation are not possible. Failure of the
outflow gates poses a serious risk for the dam system.
Frequency histograms of the reservoir volumes for each scenario are created throughout simulation
time horizon in order to have a clear understanding of the reservoir volume changes with time.
Since simulation time step is 1 hour, hourly histograms are presented.
In each scenario starting reservoir conditions (0 hours) are distributed into bins of the same width
of 5,000,000 m3, starting with 5,000,000 m3 and ending with 65,000,000 m3. 5,000,000 m3 to
65,000,000 m3 is the range of the Cheakamus Dam reservoir storage. An example of the 0-hour
histogram with 10 bins is shown in Figure 46.
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Figure 46. An example of starting reservoir volume histogram
Reservoir volume histograms after one, two, and three hours of simulation time have two different
bins. An example of the histogram for later stages of the simulation is shown in Figure 39.

Figure 47. An example of reservoir volume histogram after 1, 2 or 3 hours of simulation time
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The ninth bin from the 0-hour histogram has different width. New ninth bin ranges from
44,654,877 m3 to 58,254,767 m3. Those volume values correspond to free crest weirs (overflowing
facilities) elevation and elevation of the top of the dam. This bin is in orange color. Therefore, the
frequency of the reservoir volumes in the orange bin is equal to the number of simulations in which
uncontrolled spilling occurred over the free crest weirs. This is the number of times H-2 hazard
occurs in the selected scenario.
The tenth bin also has different width in later stages. The tenth bin is colored red and ranges from
58,254,767 m3 to 65,000,000 m3. Lower volume value corresponds to the elevation of the top of
the dam. Therefore, the frequency of the reservoir volumes in the red bin is equal to the number of
simulations in which the dam is overtopped, which is the H-1 hazard.

4.3.1. Scenario 1: Spillway operating gates (SPOG) closed
In this Scenario, SPOGs are malfunctioning and the spillways are completely closed. SPOGs were
completely closed 1,482,624 times out of 17,791,488 combinations. This means that combinations
of system variables resulted in SPOG being closed in 1,482,624 context rows. Figures 48 to 51
show changes in the reservoir volume through time.
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Figure 48. Cheakamus Dam case study Scenario 1: frequency histogram of the reservoir volume
at the beginning of the simulation

Figure 49. Cheakamus Dam case study Scenario 1: frequency histogram of the reservoir volume
after 1 hour of the simulation
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Figure 50. Cheakamus Dam case study Scenario 1: frequency histogram of the reservoir volume
after 2 hours of the simulation

Figure 51. Cheakamus Dam case study Scenario 1: frequency histogram of the reservoir volume
after 3 hours of the simulation
91

It is evident that this is a very dangerous scenario for dam safety. The spillway can release a large
amount of water (when completely opened approximately 1600 m3/s, according to spillway
discharge curve). Uncontrolled spill over free crest weirs and through emergency ports, after 3
hours, is happening in approximately 700,000 cases (variable combinations, context “rows”) out
of 1,482,624 combinations analyzed. Additionally, the dam overtopping frequencies are
substantial. Without the main discharge facilities, most of the water will spill over overflow
facilities and will overtop the dam. The situation is only getting worse as the simulation progresses
with more reservoir volume values ending in the orange and red bins.

4.3.2. Scenario 2: SPOGs open and stuck at 1 meter
In this SThcenario, SPOGs are malfunctioning and the spillways are partially open and stuck at 1
meter from the spillway sill. SPOGs were stuck at 1 meter 164,736 times out of 17,791,488
combinations. This means that combinations of system variables resulted in SPOG being stuck at
1 meter in 164,736 context rows. Figures 52-55 show changes in the reservoir volume through
time.
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Figure 52. Cheakamus dam case study Scenario 2: frequency histogram of the reservoir volume
at the beginning of the simulation

Figure 53. Cheakamus dam case study Scenario 2: frequency histogram of the reservoir volume
after 1 hour of the simulation
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Figure 54. Cheakamus dam case study Scenario 2: frequency histogram of the reservoir volume
after 2 hours of the simulation

Figure 55. Cheakamus dam case study Scenario 2: frequency histogram of the reservoir volume
after 3 hours of the simulation
94

Not as bad as Scenario 1, but uncontrolled spills and overtopping are still occurring. Uncontrolled
spill over free crest weirs and through emergency ports, after 3 hours, is happening in
approximately 78,000 cases (variable combinations, context “rows”) out of 164,736 combinations
analyzed. Additionally, the dam overtopping frequencies are still substantial. Slightly raised
spillway gates do not mitigate the overtopping and uncontrolled spills. The frequency of reservoir
volume values ending in the “orange” and “red” ranges is increasing after each hour.

4.3.3. Scenario 3: SPOGs open and stuck at 3 meters
In this scenario, SPOGs are malfunctioning and the spillways are partially open and stuck at 3
meters from the spillway sill. SPOGs were stuck at 3 meters 164,736 times out of 17,791,488
combinations. Figures 56 to 59 show changes in the reservoir volume through time.
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Figure 56. Cheakamus dam case study Scenario 3: frequency histogram of the reservoir volume
at the beginning of the simulation

Figure 57. Cheakamus dam case study Scenario 3: frequency histogram of the reservoir volume
after 1 hour of the simulation
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Figure 58. Cheakamus dam case study Scenario 3: frequency histogram of the reservoir volume
after 2 hours of the simulation

Figure 59. Cheakamus dam case study Scenario 3: frequency histogram of the reservoir volume
after 3 hours of the simulation
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Uncontrolled spills and overtopping are still occurring. Uncontrolled spill over free crest weirs and
through emergency ports, after 3 hours, is occurring in approximately 71,000 cases (variable
combinations, context “rows”) out of 164,736 combinations analyzed. Additionally, the dam
overtopping frequencies are still substantial, but less than in Scenario 2. Additionally, a slow shift
of the reservoir volumes to the lower ranges is noticeable.

4.3.4. Scenario 4: SPOGs open and stuck at 5 meters
In this Scenario, SPOGs are malfunctioning and the spillways are partially open and stuck at 5
meters from the spillway sill. SPOGs were stuck at 5 meters 164,736 times out of 17,791,488
combinations. Figures 60 to 64 show changes in the reservoir volume through time.

Figure 60. Cheakamus dam case study Scenario 4: frequency histogram of the reservoir volume
at the beginning of the simulation
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Figure 61. Cheakamus dam case study Scenario 4: frequency histogram of the reservoir volume
after 1 hour of the simulation

Figure 62. Cheakamus dam case study Scenario 4: frequency histogram of the reservoir volume
after 2 hours of the simulation
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Figure 63. Cheakamus dam case study Scenario 4: frequency histogram of the reservoir volume
after 3 hours of the simulation
Improvements compared to two previous scenarios are noticeable, but uncontrolled spills and
overtopping are still occurring. Uncontrolled spill over free crest weirs and through emergency
ports, after 3 hours, is occurring in approximately 67,000 cases out of 164,736 combinations
analyzed. Additionally, the dam overtopping frequencies are still substantial, but less than in
Scenario 3. Additionally, the slow shift of the reservoir volumes to the lower ranges is noticeable.

4.3.5. Scenario 5: Low-level outlet gate (LLOG) not functioning
In this Scenario, LLOG is malfunctioning and is completely closed. LLOG was completely closed
1,482,624 times out of 17,791,488 combinations. Figures 64 to 68 show changes in the reservoir
volume through time.
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Figure 64. Cheakamus dam case study Scenario 5: frequency histogram of the reservoir volume
at the beginning of the simulation

Figure 65. Cheakamus dam case study Scenario 5: frequency histogram of the reservoir volume
after 1 hour of the simulation
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Figure 66. Cheakamus dam case study Scenario 5: frequency histogram of the reservoir volume
after 2 hours of the simulation

Figure 67. Cheakamus dam case study Scenario 5: frequency histogram of the reservoir volume
after 3 hours of the simulation
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The results are relatively close to Scenario 1 and there are two reasons for it: (1) four out of thirteen
inflow values are over the updated probable maximum flood value, and (2) in order to investigate
all of the possible system states, three out of eleven starting reservoir volume (5,000,00065,000,000 m3) values are over the value that corresponds to the elevation of the overflow
facilities. Spillway gates cannot be controlled and used when they are overtopped, which explains
the results. Uncontrolled spill over free crest weirs and through emergency ports, after 3 hours, is
happening in approximately 650,000 cases (variable combinations, context “rows”) out of
1,482,624 combinations analyzed. Additionally, the dam overtopping frequencies are substantial.

4.3.6. Scenario 6: Power intake gate (PG) is not functioning
In this Scenario, PG is malfunctioning and is completely closed. PG was completely closed
1,482,624 times out of 17,791,488 combinations. Figures 68 to 71 show changes in the reservoir
volume through time.
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Figure 68. Cheakamus dam case study Scenario 6: frequency histogram of the reservoir volume
at the beginning of the simulation

Figure 69. Cheakamus dam case study Scenario 6: frequency histogram of the reservoir volume
after 1 hour of the simulation
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Figure 70. Cheakamus dam case study Scenario 6: frequency histogram of the reservoir volume
after 2 hours of the simulation

Figure 71. Cheakamus dam case study Scenario 6: frequency histogram of the reservoir volume
after 3 hours of the simulation
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The results are similar to Scenario 6 since the difference between power intake and maximum
LLOG discharge (65 m3/s and approximately 200 m3/s) is not that relevant compared to the
probable maximum flood. Uncontrolled spill over free crest weirs and through emergency ports,
after 3 hours, is happening in approximately 660,000 cases out of 1,482,624 combinations
analyzed. Additionally, the dam overtopping frequencies are substantial.

4.3.7. Probability distribution of failure states
Frequency histograms are transformed into probability distribution graphs of failure states. The
probability of each bin is calculated by dividing each bin frequency value by the total number of
combinations covered by each scenario. In order to better assess the changes through time, a 3D
surface is created from hourly histogram data for each scenario. Figures 72 to 77 show probability
distribution graphs of reservoir volume for each scenario. Notice that Y and X axis scale are not
the same for each graph.
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Figure 72. Cheakamus Dam case study Scenario 1 probability distribution through time

Figure 73. Cheakamus Dam case study Scenario 2 probability distribution through time
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Figure 74. Cheakamus Dam case study Scenario 3 probability distribution through time

Figure 75. Cheakamus Dam case study Scenario 4 probability distribution through time
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Figure 76. Cheakamus Dam case study Scenario 5 probability distribution through time

Figure 77. Cheakamus Dam case study Scenario 6 probability distribution through time
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These surfaces should be considered with the previous histograms. These surfaces are created from
mesh points. Mesh point M have x, y and z coordinates, where x coordinate represents the time
passed since the beginning of the simulation, y represents the reservoir volume value, and z is the
probability of reservoir being between two values, or belonging to one bin. Or in mathematical
form:
M=(x,y,z)

(4.48)

𝑥 ∈ 𝑋 = {0,1,2,3}

(4.49)

where,

𝑦 ∈ 𝑌 = {7.5, 12.5, 17.5, 22.5, 27.5, 32.5, 37.5, 42.5, 52.5, 61} ∗ 106
𝑧 ∈ 𝑍 = [0, 1]

(4.50)
(4.51)

Notice that y coordinates are bin midpoints. This way if we pinpoint a mesh point on the surface,
we can determine the probability of reservoir being in a particular state after a certain amount of
time. This is just an alternative way of presenting the hourly histogram, with a probability of
reservoir volume belonging to each bin. The surface “temperature” (shown in different colors)
represents the probability, with dark blue being zero and yellow approximately 0.42.

Conclusions and Future Work
This research addressed the main issues and disadvantages of traditional dam systems risk analysis
methods. Traditional analysis methods place emphasis on failures opposed to control flaws and
assume linear progression of events. Traditional methods cannot account for the multiple feedback
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loops in the systems and disregard interdependencies of system components. In the traditional
analysis, human behaviour is usually oversimplified.
Cheakamus dam case study illustrates the need for a systems approach to reservoir infrastructure
risk analysis. Many hazardous states are the product of unusual combinations of usual events. The
results illustrate that extreme events are not the only source of the hazardous states. System
structure, description using identified system components and their interdependencies, together
with the identification of the control flaws is of primary importance for the analysis of system
safety.
Traditional analysis methods’ issues were approached with a systems approach to dam systems.
System dynamics simulation is used as a method to implement System Theoretic Process Analysis
(STPA). STPA is a hazard analysis method that investigates the control actions impact on the
system. Fuzzy inference system is used to model the controller’s decision – making and drive the
STPA process.
Component interdependencies, system feedbacks, the nonlinear progression of events, and event
dependencies are addressed using system dynamics simulation. Complex human behaviour and
decision making are addressed using fuzzy inference systems. Control actions and control flaws
are addressed using STPA. Dam systems are complex systems with many components and
implementing all of them in a system dynamics model is a challenge. Uncertain hydrologic and
hydraulic data, lack of dam system data, or clear connections between the system components can
negatively influence systems approach to risk analysis. The scope and the size of the modelled
system are another issue. For example, a road that is the only way to reach the dam might be
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unusable, preventing the controller from reaching the dam and performing the control action.
Looking at the Sayano – Shushenskaya accident, many social and economic factors must be taken
into consideration, such as the company privatization, focus on financial profit, and shady
maintenance contracts. These aspects are also hard to cover and implement while designing the
system model.
The developed methodology is applied to a case study system based on the BC Hydro’s
Cheakamus Dam in British Columbia. Hydrologic, hydraulic, mechanical and structural data
provided by BC Hydro is used in the study. Hydraulic capabilities of the spillway and hydrologic
data is used to develop the fuzzy inference system. Python programming language and MATLAB
software are used for automating the development of the control flaws and hazardous system states.
Control decisions were implemented in any context of the investigated system. Hazardous
combinations of control actions and system states are separated. Additionally, several failure
scenarios are used to illustrate the results of methodology implementation.
Future work will consist of adding more starting values for the system variables, implementing
more components, improving the fuzzy inference system, and developing fuzzy inference system
for control of all the outflow gates. Implementation of more variables will create even more
interdependencies and therefore describe each system in the control loop more accurately.
One of the future goals is the development of a generalized dam system model that can be applied
to various dam types, dam purposes, and all possible dam components.
The research results illustrate clearly how complex the reservoir infrastructure systems are and
what is the utility of the proposed analysis method. It is important to note that in spite our best
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efforts, there will always be an unforeseen external disturbance that cannot be easily incorporated
into the model. The results of the case study illustrate how sensitive dam systems are to losing the
ability to operate main spillway gates. Control actions can have dire consequences based on the
context in which they are issued.
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Appendix A: Cheakamus Dam Case Study FIS Rule Base
CWL is the current water level or the reservoir elevation. GP is the gate position.
Complete list of the fuzzy rules:
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Appendix B: Python Code for Automatic Context Generation
Python code for creating combinations of variables:
"""
Created on Tue Jul 14 12:33:26 2015
"""
from itertools import product
import csv

#Read in csv file
criteria = []
with open("Failure Modes.csv", 'rb') as f:
for i,row in enumerate(csv.reader(f)):
if i == 0:
header = row
else:
criteria.append(row)
#Filter spaces and separate columns
criteria = [filter(lambda x: x != '', row) for row in zip(*criteria)]
#Unpack criteria and take cartesian product
combos = product(*criteria)
#Write out combos iterator and retain original column names
with open("Failure Combos.csv", 'wb') as f:
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writer = csv.writer(f)
writer.writerow(header)
for c in combos:
writer.writerow(c)
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Appendix C: Cheakamus Dam Case Study MATLAB Simulation
Code
function [V1,V2,V3] = STPAcomb8( GO, V, IN, gate_opening,
discharge, reservoir_elevation, storage,
storagelvl,fcrl,fcd,t,sensors, debris, MG, DG, BAT, Hoist, Rope,
FuzzyGP,gate_str, sr, presence,HR,PG, llogdis,llogwl)
F=scatteredInterpolant(gate_opening, reservoir_elevation,
discharge);
filename='output13.csv';
maxit=17791488;
iter=1;
V1=zeros(17791488,1);
V2=zeros(17791488,1);
V3=zeros(17791488,1);
for i=1:maxit
cwv=V(iter);
for c=1:t
cwl=interp1(storage,storagelvl,cwv);
if (MG(iter)==0) && (DG(iter)==0) && (BAT(iter)==0)
GP=GO(iter);
GP2=min(GP, 12-debris(iter));
else
if sr(iter)==1
if sensors(iter)==1
if (cwl>367.28) && (cwl<=382) &&
(IN(iter)<=1600)
GP=evalfis([cwl IN(iter)], FuzzyGP);
GP2=min(GP, 12-debris(iter));
elseif (cwl>367.28) && (IN(iter)>1600)
GP2=12-debris(iter);
end
elseif (sensors(iter)==0) && (presence(iter)==1) &&
(c>=2)
if (cwl>367.28) && (cwl<=382) && (IN(iter)<=1600)
GP=evalfis([cwl IN(iter)], FuzzyGP);
GP2=min(GP, 12-debris(iter));
elseif (cwl>367.28) && (IN(iter)>1600)
GP2=12-debris(iter);
end
elseif (sensors(iter)==0) && (presence(iter)==0) &&
(c<=2)
GP=GO(iter);
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GP2=min(GP, 12-debris(iter));
elseif (sensors(iter)==0) && (presence(iter)==0) &&
(c>=3)
if (cwl>367.28) && (cwl<=382) && (IN(iter)<=1600)
GP=evalfis([cwl IN(iter)], FuzzyGP);
GP2=min(GP, 12-debris(iter));
elseif (cwl>367.28) && (IN(iter)>1600)
GP2=12-debris(iter);
end
elseif (sensors(iter)==0) && presence(iter)==1 && (c==1)
GP=GO(iter);
GP2=min(GP, 12-debris(iter));
elseif (sensors(iter)==2) && (c==1)
if (cwl>367.28) && (cwl<=368.28)
GP2=0;
elseif (cwl>368.28) && (cwl<=382) &&
(IN(iter)<1600)
k=cwl-1;
GP=evalfis([k IN(iter)], FuzzyGP);
GP2=min(GP, 12-debris(iter));
elseif (cwl>368.28) && (IN(iter)>1600)
GP2=12-debris(iter);
end
elseif (sensors(iter)==2) && (c>=2)
if (cwl>367.28) && (cwl<=382) && (IN(iter)<=1600)
GP=evalfis([cwl IN(iter)], FuzzyGP);
GP2=min(GP, 12-debris(iter));
elseif (cwl>367.28) && (IN(iter)>1600)
GP2=12-debris(iter);
end
end
elseif sr(iter)==0
if presence(iter)==1
if sensors(iter)==1
if (cwl>367.28) && (cwl<=382) &&
(IN(iter)<=1600)
GP=evalfis([cwl IN(iter)], FuzzyGP);
GP2=min(GP, 12-debris(iter));
elseif (cwl>367.28) && (IN(iter)>1600)
GP2=12-debris(iter);
end
elseif (sensors(iter)==0) && (c==1)
GP=GO(iter);
GP2=min(GP, 12-debris(iter));
elseif (sensors(iter)==0) && (c>=2)
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if (cwl>367.28) && (cwl<=382) &&
(IN(iter)<=1600)
GP=evalfis([cwl IN(iter)], FuzzyGP);
GP2=min(GP, 12-debris(iter));
elseif (cwl>367.28) && (IN(iter)>1600)
GP2=12-debris(iter);
end
elseif (sensors(iter)==2) && (c==1)
if (cwl>367.28) && (cwl<=368.28)
GP2=0;
elseif (cwl>368.28) && (cwl<=382) &&
(IN(iter)<1600)
k=cwl-1;
GP=evalfis([k IN(iter)], FuzzyGP);
GP2=min(GP, 12-debris(iter));
elseif (cwl>368.28) && (IN(iter)>1600)
GP2=12-debris(iter);
end
elseif (sensors(iter)==2) && (c>=2)
if (cwl>367.28) && (cwl<=382) &&
(IN(iter)<=1600)
GP=evalfis([cwl IN(iter)], FuzzyGP);
GP2=min(GP, 12-debris(iter));
elseif (cwl>367.28) && (IN(iter)>1600)
GP2=12-debris(iter);
end
end
elseif presence(iter)==0
if c<=2
GP=GO(iter);
GP2=min(GP, 12-debris(iter));
end
if c>=3
if (cwl>367.28) && (cwl<=382) &&
(IN(iter)<=1600)
GP=evalfis([cwl IN(iter)], FuzzyGP);
GP2=min(GP, 12-debris(iter));
elseif (cwl>367.28) && (IN(iter)>1600)
GP2=12-debris(iter);
end
end
end
end
end
if cwl<378.41
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overflow=0;
else
overflow=interp1(fcrl, fcd, cwl);
end
if cwl<367.28
outflow=0;
else
if gate_str(iter)==1
if ((MG(iter)==0) && (DG(iter)==0) &&
(BAT(iter)==0)) || (Hoist(iter)==0)
outflow=F(GO(iter), cwl);
elseif (Rope(iter)==0)
outflow=0;
else
outflow=F(GP2, cwl);
end
elseif gate_str(iter)==0
outflow=0;
elseif gate_str(iter)==2
outflow=F(GO(iter), cwl);
end
end
if ((IN(iter)>1600) && HR(iter)==1) ||
((gate_str(iter)==0) && HR(iter)==0)
LLD=interp1(llogwl,llogdis, cwl);
else
LLD=0;
end
if ((IN(iter)>1600+LLD) && PG(iter)==1) ||
((gate_str(iter)==0) && PG(iter)==1)
PD=min(65, IN(iter)-1600-LLD);
else
PD=0;
end
if ((MG(iter)==0) && (DG(iter)==0) &&
(BAT(iter)==0))
LLD=0;
PD=0;
end
newwv=min((cwv+3600*(IN(iter)-outflowoverflow-LLD-PD)), 58254767);
cwv=newwv;
if c==1
V1(iter,1)=newwv;
elseif c==2
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V2(iter,1)=newwv;
elseif c==3
V3(iter,1)=newwv;
end
c=c+1;
end
iter=iter+1;
end
CO1=[V1 V2 V3];
csvwrite(filename, CO1);
end
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Appendix D: MATLAB Code for The Simulation Using Fuzzy
Control Action Rules
function [RE2] = EXP2(
gate_opening,discharge,reservoir_elevation,inflow,storage,storagelvl,
swl,FIS)
F=scatteredInterpolant(gate_opening, reservoir_elevation, discharge);
filename='output12.xlsx';
maxit=32;
iter=1;
RE2=zeros(32,1);
GPE2=zeros(32,1);
cwl=swl;
for i=1:maxit
if cwl<=367.28
GP=0;
elseif cwl>367.28
GP=evalfis([inflow(iter) cwl], FIS);
end
if cwl<=367.28
outflow=0;
elseif cwl>367.28
outflow=F(GP, cwl);
end
cwv=interp1(storagelvl, storage, cwl);
newwv=min(38859746, (cwv+3600*inflow(iter)-3600*outflow));
newwl=interp1(storage,storagelvl, newwv);
cwl=newwl;
iter=iter+1;
RE2(i,1)=cwl;
GPE2(i,1)=GP;
end
CO=[RE2 GPE2];
xlswrite(filename, CO);
end
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Appendix E: MATLAB Code for The Simulation Using Crisp Control
Action Rules
function [RE2] = EXP22(
gate_opening,discharge,reservoir_elevation,inflow,storage,storagelvl, swl)
F=scatteredInterpolant(gate_opening, reservoir_elevation, discharge);
filename='output12.xlsx';
maxit=214;
iter=1;
RE2=zeros(214,1);
GPE2=zeros(214,1);
cwl=swl;
for i=1:maxit
if cwl<=367.28
GP=0;
elseif (cwl>367.28 && cwl<372) && (inflow(iter)>0 && inflow(iter)<=25)
GP=0;
elseif (cwl>=372 && cwl<375) && (inflow(iter)>0 && inflow(iter)<=25)
GP=0;
elseif (cwl>=375 && cwl<=377) && (inflow(iter)>0 && inflow(iter)<=25)
GP=0;
elseif (cwl>367.28 && cwl<372) && (inflow(iter)>25 && inflow(iter)<=75)
GP=1;
elseif (cwl>=372 && cwl<375) && (inflow(iter)>25 && inflow(iter)<=75)
GP=0.5;
elseif (cwl>=375 && cwl<=377) && (inflow(iter)>25 && inflow(iter)<=75)
GP=0.5;
elseif (cwl>367.28 && cwl<372) && (inflow(iter)>75 && inflow(iter)<=125)
GP=2;
elseif (cwl>=372 && cwl<375) && (inflow(iter)>75 && inflow(iter)<=125)
GP=1.5;
elseif (cwl>=375 && cwl<=377) && (inflow(iter)>75 && inflow(iter)<=125)
GP=1;
elseif (cwl>367.28 && cwl<372) && (inflow(iter)>125 &&
inflow(iter)<=175)
GP=3;
elseif (cwl>=372 && cwl<375) && (inflow(iter)>125 && inflow(iter)<=175)
GP=2;
elseif (cwl>=375 && cwl<=377) && (inflow(iter)>125 && inflow(iter)<=175)
GP=1.5;
elseif (cwl>367.28 && cwl<372) && (inflow(iter)>175 && inflow(iter)<=200)
GP=3;
elseif (cwl>=372 && cwl<375) && (inflow(iter)>175 && inflow(iter)<=200)
GP=3;
elseif (cwl>=375 && cwl<=377) && (inflow(iter)>175 && inflow(iter)<=200)
GP=2;
end
if cwl<=367.28
outflow=0;
elseif cwl>367.28
outflow=F(GP, cwl);
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end
cwv=interp1(storagelvl, storage, cwl);
newwv=min(38859746, (cwv+3600*inflow(iter)-3600*outflow));
newwl=interp1(storage,storagelvl, newwv);
cwl=newwl;
iter=iter+1;
RE2(i,1)=cwl;
GPE2(i,1)=GP;
end
CO=[RE2 GPE2];
xlswrite(filename, CO);
end
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